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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Rationale and Objectives 
The main objectives of this paper are, firstly, to investigate 
some aspects of the recent historical evolution of the central 
government's total debt with particular reference to the longer-
term relationship between the budget and the growth of the 
outstanding debt, and secondly, to assess the stability of the 
central government's current debt situation, taking a medium-term 
view into the 1990s. 
Reference will be made to the government's gross debt as well as 
its net debt (i.e., financial liabilities less financial assets). 
However, apaLt from the fact that there is a lack of reliable 
data on the historical net debt situation, the quantitative 
importance of the government's financial assets in its overall 
debt situation has also diminished markedly over the last ten 
years. Partly for these reasons but also out of a desire to k«ep 
the focus of the paper on the existing budgetary framework, the 
forward-looking analysis will concentrate on the evolution of the 
gross rather than the net debt situation of the central 
govermueut. 
Following similar studies abroad, the paper will not examine the 
distribution of the total debt between domestic and foreign debt, 
nor will it examine the maturity structure or ownership 
distribution of the total debt, although aspects of debt 
management such as these obviously impact on the capacity of the 
economy to absorb debt as well as on the government's debt 
service burden. 
Neither does trie paper examine the current and future budgetary 
implications of (1) the very extensive volume of financial 
guarantees provided by the government, or (2/ the potential 
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financial claims on the Exchequer in respect of accumulated 
foreign exchange losses of the South African Reserve Bank, or (3) 
the potential liabilities of the government in respect of any of 
the country's social welfare funds or the government service 
pension and provident funds. 
The rationale for the study may be described as follows. The 
government's gross debt has grown considerably since the late 
1970s. However, despite the recorded increase in the absolute 
level of debt, the importance of the debt in the economy remained 
relatively stable between 19b3 and 1987 in the sense that the 
outstanding debt, as a ratio of gross national product (GNP), 
remained almost constant. In contrast, the average rate of 
interest on the outstanding debt increased fairly dramatically 
from 7,87 per cent in 1980/81 to 14,55 per cent in 1986/87 If 
the government's net debt situation is considered instead, the 
extent to which the absorption of government funds by net debt 
service costs increased in the 1980s was even more pronounced. 
As a resuit, the share of debt service costs in both total and 
current outlays of the government increased quite dramatically. 
Given the enormous pressures currently on the central government 
to provide increasing amounts of public services and/or to reduce 
taxation, there is legitimate concern that rising budget deficits 
could impact on the already high debt service burden by further 
raising the outstanding debt, and that ever increasing debt 
service costs as a proportion of government spending may 
consequently become a serious constraint on the flexibility and 
stability of budgetary policy in South Africa, including the 
ability of the government to lower tax rates to more acceptable 
levels. 
This paper seeks to contribute to the discussion of these issues 
by focusing on the relationship between the budget and the 
evolution of the outstanding debt. A special area of focus is 
therefore the so-called forward-looking fiscal calculus, which is 
used here to make some projections of the longer-term debt and 
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budgetary implications of alternative fiscal scenarios. 
1.2 Focus on the Fiscal Calculus 
The fiscal calculus runs in terms of budgetary deficits, the 
growth of the economy, interest rates and the growth of public 
debt. The reciprocal relationship between the budget and the 
public debt can be explained in simple terms as follows. 
If the government incurs a budget deficit in fiscal year 1987, it 
adds to the volume of outstanding debt and interest has to be 
paid on the debt in 1988. This interest forms part of government 
outlays in 1988 and unless tax revenues are higher or other 
expenses are reduced, the budget deficit increases. The now 
higher budget deficit adds to the public debt in 1988 and 
interest has to be paid on a still higher debt in 1989, and so 
on. The question is, will the continuous rolling on of interest 
payments in this way cause the outstanding debt and interest 
payments to expand indefinitely or to unacceptable levels? 
An indefinite rise, or so-called "explosion", of debt and 
interest as a ratio of GNP is more likely to occur if interest 
rates rise above the growth rate of GNP. Conversely, if the 
growth rate of GNP exceeds the interest rate, the debt and 
interest as a ratio of GNP will rise to a finite ceiling. When a 
country is faced by an adverse, i.e., a negative growth-interest 
differential, and is unable to reduce its budget deficit, it may 
be said to be in a so-called "debt trap". 
A more elaborate treatment of the fiscal calculus will be 
presented in Section 4. 
1.3 Budgetary and Debt Concepts 
Since the relationship between the budget and the outstanding 
debt constitutes a key element of the fiscal calculus, it is as 
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well to be clear from the outset about the meaning of these 
concepts. 
The budget referred to in the paper is the budget of the central 
government^' (i.e., the budget that is presented annually to 
Parliament by the Minister of Finance). Its accounting framework 
is the State Revenue Account. This account is currently a sub-
account of the State Revenue Fund or its banking equivalent, the 
Exchequer Account. (See Section 5.1 for a more detailed 
description of the division of the State Revenue Fund into its 
several sub-accounts). 
Although the State Revenue Fund lies at the centre of the central 
government's entire financial system, the Fund's outlays and 
revenues are not synonymous with the expenditures and revenues of 
the central government as defined in the national accounts. 
Indeed, the coverage of the so-called central government budget 
is such that it excludes a considerable but variable volume of 
extra-budgetary transactions, a fact which gives the budget a 
considerable potential both to be manipulated and itself to give 
a distorted picture of the government's influence on the economy. 
The government's extra-budgetary transactions, moreover, impinge 
on the ownership distribution of the outstanding debt. Such 
transactions thus obviously have implications for the destination 
and significance of government interest payments. For example, 
interest on government securities accruing to separate funds such 
as the Special Defence Account may perhaps be regarded as 
disguised additional budgetary allocations to the separate funds 
rather than as interest. This particular issue touches on the 
whole question of how big a part of the outstanding debt is 
really held outside the central government sector, lather than by 
government agencies. By focusing exclusively on (1) the annual 
budget, (2) the financing of budget deficits by the issue of 
debt, and (3) the burden imposed on the budget by the accumulated 
debt, the 'present study obviously deals only with a part of the 
central government's finances. 
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However, the importance of the traditional central government 
budget per se lies in the fact that, despite its lack of 
comprehensiveness, it does form the basis for the Finance 
Minister's major fiscal policy decisions, and is widely used as a 
broad indicator of the government's fiscal stance. These are 
also the reasons why the present study will concentrate on the 
debt of the "central government" rather than, say, the central 
government sector or the general government sector. Basing the 
study on broader concepts of debt such as the latter two might 
have enhanced the international comparability of the results, but 
would have produced little of practical relevance for fiscal 
policy making in South Africa. 
The debt concept corresponding to the central government's 
budget, as defined above, is the so-called State Debt. In the 
main, the latter represents directly or indirectly the cumulative 
effect of the financing of past budget (State Revenue Fund) 
deficits by the raising of l o a n s . Interest on the State Debt 
also forms a direct statutory charge against the State Revenue 
Fund. It is on the state Debt and its evolution between 1960 
and 1997 that attention is therefore focused in this paper. 
The State Debt per se is a gross debt concept, in more senses 
than one, i.e., it takes no account of any off-setting financial 
claims that the central government (the political entity) has 
accumulated on other sectors, nor does it take account of the 
fact, alluded to above, that a part of the outstanding debt may 
be held by other central government departments, frequently 
through the office of the Public Investment Commissioners 
(formerly the Public Debt Commissioners) and the Corporation for 
Public Deposits, or by the South African Reserve Bank which has 
relevant financial links with the budget (in the sense that the 
whole or part of interest payments to the Reserve Bank may return 
to the Exchequer as profits of the former). 
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It is also necessary to distinguish between the State Debt and 
South Africa's public debt.(3) All debt issued by public 
authorities in South Africa, whether by general government 
departments or business enterprises at whatever level, form part 
of South Africa's total public debt. In addition to the debt 
issued by the central government itself, the public debt thus 
includes loans raised by, e.g., the separate national states and 
universities (at general central government level), and the 
municipalities (at general local government local level), as well 
as loans raised by departmental business enterprises, including 
inter alia the National Housing Commission, SATS, the Department 
of Posts and Telecommunications and the other so-called public 
corporations. The State Debt is clearly only part of the total 
public debt, and it should therefore be distinguished from 
broader debt concepts such as the debt of the combined central 
government^, or the debt of the general government.^ 
1.4 The Consequences of High and Growing Debt Levels 
In a study such as the present one it is important at the outset 
to distinguish clearly between: (i) the impact of budget deficits 
and their financing on the flows of savings and investment in the 
oconomy; and (ii; the impact of budget deficits on the 
outstanding stock of government debt in relation to GNP, and the 
budgetary cost of servicing that debt. It is the second of these 
two aspects of public borrowing policy which is relevant to the 
subject matter of this study. The question is: do the 
accumulated government debt and annual additions to it impose 
constraints on fiscal policy in addition to those arising from 
the need to shape current deficits in relation to the current and 
expected flows of savings and investment? 
There are two main problems associated with a large stock of 
outstanding debt in relation to GNP. These are discussed below, 
with particular reference to the discussions in OECD Economic 
Outlook, 11984 and 1985;. 
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Government Debt and Interest Rates 
There is, firstly, the risk of upward pressure on nominal and 
real interest rates. This risk is associated with the 
possibility that the economy may have a limited capacity to 
absorb increasing amounts of government debt. The link between 
interest rates and stocks of debt could arise through two 
channels. The first is that higher real interest rates may have 
to be paid in order to induce private investors to hold increased 
shares of government stock in their portfolios. Any reluctance 
on the part of financial markets to absorb disproportionate 
amounts of government debt into private portfolios will thus tend 
to be reflected in upward pressure on interest rates. 
The second way in which a high outstanding stock of debt may 
influence interest rates is through inflationary expectations. 
High and growing levels of debt in relation to GNP may be 
associated with fears, on the part of savers, of future inflation 
in case of monetisation or higher taxes to service the debt. 
Such fears of high inflation will tend to be reflected in greater 
risk premiums, resulting in rising nominal and real interest 
rates. 
It is axiomatic that concern in the financial markets would be 
greater the higher the current level of debt in relation to GNP, 
and the larger the current additions being made to it. However, 
such a general conclusion is subject to two important caveats. 
Firstly, since it is the average level of budget deficits over 
the course of the business cycle, and not the actual level in any 
one year that determines the growth rate of the outstanding debt 
in the medium-term, it is essential to distinguish between 
cyclical and structural increases in the debt/GNP ratio. To the 
extent that debt increases are perceived by the financial markets 
as a cyclical phenomenon (and thus likely to be reversed over the 
remainder of the business cycle), undesirable expectational 
effects might be limited. Conversely, permanent-, or sustained 
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increases in the debt/GNP ratio, which are associated with larger 
structural budget deficits, are more likely to result in rising 
interest rates especially in the case of a non-accommodating 
monetary policy. 
Secondly, it seems impossible to stipulate an optimal debt/GNP 
ratio for a particular country. According to the OECD there does 
not appear to be any obvious policy rule for the ideal or optimal 
level of debt, applicable to all countries. In the words of 
Muller and Price: 
"There appears to be no generally optimal ratio of 
gross government debt to GNP - in proximate terms, any 
fixed debt-GNP ratio might, within wide bounds, be said 
to be a 'steady state' (i.e., sustainable) position 
..." (Muller and Price, 1984b). 
Comparative studies have therefore revealed large differences in 
debt levels between countries and in the same country at 
different times. The appropriate level of debt and the rate of 
adjustment towards that level appear to depend on many factors 
(OECD, 19a5, p. 8). The result is a lack of consensus on what 
optimal debt levels might be and especially on how fast 
governments should strive to achieve such levels: 
"Although the need to limit or reverse increases in the 
ratios of debt to GNP is widely recognised, there is 
not yet a concensus on the longer-run goals of fiscal 
policy with respect to such ratios". (OECD, 1985, p.6). 
The Debt Service Burden 
The second major difficulty associated with large stocks of 
government debt is the budget inflexibility resulting from an 
increased burden of debt service payments. In the context of 
persistently high interest rates and large deficits, there is the 
risk that debt levels and interest costs could "explode" because 
of the compounding effect of interest payments. With a major 
component of'expenditures thus committed to rise as a proportion 
of GNP, a squeeze on other components of expenditure will be 
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required merely to maintain the structural component of the 
deficit as a share of GNP. In other words, to avoid even larger 
deficits as debt service costs rise, taxes would have to rise or 
non-interest spending to fall, imposing considerable difficulties 
on any government aiming for a reduction in tax burdens and/or 
maintaining politically sensitive public expenditures. Moreover, 
if, at some stage, the economy should slow down, and the cyclical 
component of the budget deficit should increase, the need to make 
further budget savings in order to avoid incurring even more 
rapidly increasing debt service commitments, would become even 
more acute. 
The niacro-economic effectiveness of budgetary policy in 
influencing aggregate demand is, moreover, likely to be 
diminished if interest payments (which often have a relatively 
high savings "leakage" in the hands of households) are 
substituted in the budget for direct expenditures on goods and 
services. 
1.5 Outline of the Study 
The study comprises nine parts- Part 2 below describes the 
international background against which the present project has 
been undertaken. This is followed in Part 3 by a brief sketch of 
recent South African developments in the same general sphere of 
budgetary policy. 
The essentials of the forward-looking fiscal calculus are set out 
in Part 4. 
Various aspects of the recent historical evolution of the central 
government's debt situation are examined in Parts 5, 6 and 7, 
while Part 8 uses the analytics of Part 4 in order to assess the 
stability of the current and prospective fiscal scenarios. 
Part 9 concludes the paper. 
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2. INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND 
This study must be viewed against the background of a recent 
revival of interest, in South Africa and abroad, in the public 
debt as a budgetary phenomenon. The present section provides a 
brief sketch of recent overseas developments, while Section 3 
will provide a South African background. 
2.1 Classical Views 
While several objective factors, including the oil crises of the 
1970s, declining growth rates and the acceleration of inflation, 
contributed to a rapid deterioration in the public financial 
position of many countries during the 1970s, an indifferent and 
careless attitude by governments towards budget deficits and 
public debt also played an important role. The more relaxed 
attitude towards borrowing is widely attributed to the 
abandonment, since the 1930s of the classical budget-balancing 
norms o± fiscal prudence and responsibility in favour of open-
ended Keynesian fiscal activism, focusing on the budget's short-
term impact on aggregate demand. 
Classical views on public finance and budget deficits were 
dominated by a concern with the public debt. Classical 
economists were almost unanimous in condemning budget deficits 
and the accumulation of debt. Although it was frequently 
conceded that deficit financing was permissible in times of war, 
they were concerned that in peacetime it would lead to fiscal 
irresponsibility and wastefulness. It was also feared that the 
burden of the public debt could become excessive because of the 
taxation required to service it. Taxes in turn were considered 
to be harmful because of the burden they imposed on productive 
activity. In this kind of environment, low expenditure and 
budget surpluses were the order of the day, except in war-time. 
In other words, . responsible financial conduct by the government 
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was viewed in basically the same light as that tor the family. 
Frugality was the cardinal virtue, and this norm was given 
practical shape in the widely shared principle that government 
budgets should be in balance, if not in surplus, and that 
deficits were acceptable only in extraordinary circumstances. 
Large and continuing budget deficits were interpreted as the mark 
of folly. 
2.2 Tlie Keynesian Revolution 
The Keynesian revolution of the late 1930s brought a significant 
change in these traditional attitudes towards fiscal policy and 
budget deficits. In sharp contrast to pre-Keynesian concerns 
with the longer-term implications of government borrowing and 
public debt, Keynesian analysis focused on the short-term link 
between budget deficits and aggregate demand, with fiscal policy 
being seen as a means of achieving an appropriate level of real 
demand, and hence employment, in the short-term. The Keynesian 
vision of how the economy worked was widely shared in the first 
three decades after 1945. 
The notion of an unstable economy whose performance could be 
improved through the manipulation of government budgets produced 
a general principle that budgets need not be balanced. Indeed 
balanced budgets would mean that the government was not doing its 
duty. In short, the classical norm of balanced budgets was 
replaced by the Keynesian norm of unbalanced budgets: 
"The Keynesian platform for economic management 
replaced the old-fashioned belief in a balanced budget 
with what was viewed as a new and superior principle, 
that of using the budget - deficits and surpluses - to 
balance the economy." iWagner, et al, 1982, p.9). 
Under the new fiscal regime, deficits were thus no longer viewed 
as a sign of irresponsible government action, and the avoidance 
of budget deficits, along with some effort to reduce the public 
11 
debt, ceased to be a sine qua non of fiscal behaviour. In the 
words of Hugh Dalton: 
"we may now free ourselves from the old and narrow 
conception of balancing the budget, no matter over what 
period, and move towards the new and wider conception 
of the budget balancing the economy." (Dalton, 1954, 
p.221) . 
One country after another therefore discarded the old norms of 
responsible fiscal conduct in favour of the new doctrine with its 
emphasis on the functional use of the budget for short-term 
demand management purposes. In particular, the traditional or 
classical principles of sound finance, which had held that no 
borrowing was justified if associated with unproductive 
expenditures, were abandoned in favour of activist fiscal 
policies. The latter soon went far beyond deficits in recession. 
Deficits were often larger than could be reconciled with pure 
Keynesian principles of smoothing out fluctuations in demand, so 
that permanent and sustained fiscal deficits or so-called 
structural deficits became the norm rather than the exception in 
many countries. 
2.J The Revival of Classical Concerns 
Keynesian theory of counter-cyclical policy failed to give 
adequate recognition to the shortcomings of the political systems 
within which policy was to function. The running of deficits was 
actually only part of the Keynesian contra-cyclical policy 
prescription. As developed by the economists who advocated 
macro-economic planning fiscal policy was to be devoted to 
smoothing out cycles in private economic activity. It was 
therefore to be symmetrical, guided by the same principle during 
both recession and inflation, i.e., deficits would be created 
during recession and surpluses during inflation. However, over 
the course of the cycle, the budget could remain in balance. As 
James Buchanan remarked: 
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"The time-honoured norm of budget balance was thus 
jettisoned, but, in the pure logic of Keynesian 
policy,there was no one way departure. It might even 
be said that Keynesian economics did not destroy the 
principle of a balanced budget, but only lengthened the 
time-period over which it applied, from a calendar year 
to the period of a business cycle." ^Buchanan, 1978, 
p.15). 
However, Keynesian fiscal policies were made to function rather 
differently when put into practice. The reason, according to 
Buchanan, was that after the abandonment of classical principles 
of sound finance, political institutions were no longer 
constrained as before. He said: 
"Anyone, citizens no less than politicians, would 
typically like to live beyond his means. Individual 
citizens generally face a personal or household budget 
constraint which prevents them from acting on this 
desire, although some counterfeit and others go 
bankrupt. I n the century before the shift in belief 
wrought by the Keynesian revolution, politicians acted 
as if they sensed a similar constraint when making the 
nation's budgetary choices. Contemporary political 
institutions, however, are constrained differently 
because of the general belief in the Keynesian vision. 
This shift in constraints due to the shift in general 
beliefs alters the character of governmental budgetary 
policy. While there is little political resistance to 
budget deficits, there is substantial resistance to 
budget surpluses. Hence, fiscal policy will tend to be 
applied asymmetrically: deficits will be created 
frequently, but surpluses will materialise only rarely. 
This bias results from the shift in the general, public 
impression or understanding of the Western economic 
order, and of the related rules of thumb held generally 
by the citizenry as to what constitutes prudent, 
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reasonable, or efficacious conduct by government in 
running its budget." (Buchanan, 1978, p.18). 
Although deficits were therefore created during recessions, these 
were not followed by offsetting surpluses when economic activity 
improveu. There was, moreover, little political opposition to 
non-recessionary deficits. Buchanan had this to say about 
Keynesian economics: 
"Keynesian economics has turned the politicians loose; 
it has destroyed the effective constraint on 
politicians' ordinary appetites to spend and spend 
without the apparent necessity to tax." (Buchanan, 1978, 
p.27 ). 
The IMF's de Larosiere described the disintegration of the 
traditional doctrine of balanced budgets as follows: 
" ... the traditional stigma attaching to fiscal 
deficits and growing public debt gave way to a certain 
nonchalance and laxity on the part of policy makers. 
Fiscal deficits no longer required justification, and 
they did not seem to have undesirable political 
repercussions, even when they occurred during non-
recessionary periods." (de Larosiere, 1984, p.261). 
Some economists see political bias in favour of higher spending 
as an important cause of the growing public indebtedness of many 
governments. De Larosiere has, for example, noted that: 
"Because the beneficiaries of these (government) 
services represented large and politically powerful 
groups, while those who opposed them were less numerous 
and less concentrated, the political process generally 
favoured their expansion. If the cost of these 
services had been totally covered by ordinary revenue, 
we would have witnessed a process of income 
redistri'bution in favor of lower-income users of these 
services, without fiscal deficits. However, while the 
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electorate pushed for higher spending, it was far less 
supportive of the tax increases that would have been 
needed to finance that spending. As time passed, and 
in spite of substantial tax increases in all industrial 
countries, the gap between government spending and 
revenue grew, contributing eventually to higher public 
debt burden." (de Larosiere, 1984, p.261). 
in the United States in particular, there is a strong body of 
support for some sort of constitutional amendment to restore 
discipline and responsibility to the budgetary process,^' 
Public and congressional debate over more than a decade on this 
latter issue culminated in the passing in December 1985 of the 
so-called Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget balancing law (i.e., the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985). The 
countering of the built-in bias in the United States budgetary 
process in favour of government spending and budget deficits is 
seen as an important rationale for the enactment of this 
legislation. For example, it was noted in the United states 
budget for the fiscal year 1987 that: 
"The American political system faces a great test. At 
present, the benefits of goverment programs tend to be 
concentrated on particular fiscal constituencies which 
lobby to defend their benefits, while the costs of such 
programs are spread over the population at large. The 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985, better known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
amendment (GKH), was designed to cut through this 
Gordian knot and return the budget to balance by 1991." 
(United States, 1986a, p.2-3). 
By passing this law, Congress bound itself to f>,ve years of 
enforced deficit reduction, with the goal of balancing the budget 
by October 1990. 
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But there appears to be limited support outside the United States 
for a constitutional approach to the problem of maintaining 
fiscal discipline. Budgetary decisions, i.e., the allocation of 
resources, distribution of income and issues of stabilisation 
I such as the choice between inflation and unemployment), are 
essentually political issues and those who hold power are 
unlikely to restrict their political freedom in that regard. The 
support that exists for a constitutional budgetary constraint in 
the United states is often considered to be a result of the 
country's peculair system of Congressional decision-making. In 
the United Kingdom, for example, there is very limited support 
for the concept of a constitutional limitation of any kind on 
deficits or spending, there being, of course, no written 
constitution in the United Kingdom.^' 
Legislative constraints on government borrowing for purposes of 
financing consumption exist in West Germany, Japan and 
Switzerland (Chouraqui and Price, 1983, p.34). In West Germany a 
constitutional constraint on the financing of current 
expenditures from loans was imposed in terms of the Growth and 
Stability Act of 1967, the passing of which is said to have 
heralded the beginning of the Keynesian era in Germany. However, 
the Act failed to have the desired effect, and has not prevented 
the authorities from running budget deficits in excess of their 
own capital expenditure, often disguised through redefinitions of 
expenditures and other forms of window-dressing. The latter is 
reminiscent of South Africa's own experience with dual budgeting, 
which will be reviewed in Section 3.1. 
However, despite the limited support for a return to the rigid 
budget-balancing rules of fiscal restraint, which exerted such a 
dominant influence on public finance in the pre-Keynesian years, 
some of the former concerns over longer-term fiscal issues on 
which most attention was focused before Keynes, have once more 
become an important part of discussions of fiscal policy (de 
Larosiere, 1984; and Odling-smee, 1985). In particular, there is 
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a much greater awareness than before of the longer-term 
constraints on fiscal policy. 
The rapid growth of public debt, relative to GNP, since the early 
1970s has become a major policy concern in many countries, 
including many OECD member countries. As Table 1 shows, debt 
levels grew dramatically in many countries between 1970 and 
1983. As a result there was a rapid escalation of debt service 
costs in relation to GNP, giving rise to fears in some countries 
that the situation may become explosive: 
"Since the late 1970s interest rates have been 
particularly high in most member countries, generally 
exceeding economic growth rates. Given the large 
budget deficits, this has led to a rapid increase in 
government debt service payments and raised concern 
that the compounding effects of such a situation would 
imply continuously growing deficits and an explosion of 
debt as a proportion of GNP." (Chouraqui, Jones and 
Montador, 1986, p.13). 
A reduction of debt levels together with the aim of reducing 
taxes have been an important motivation in many countries to 
pursue policies of fiscal consolidation. 
Both the IMF and the OECD regularly exhort their member countries 
to reduce the ratio of debt to national income. Public debt 
developments in member countries and the debt service burden now 
also feature regularly in OECD reviews (OECD, 1984, and OECD, 
1985). The so-called fiscal calculus has also received 
considerable attention (Chouraqui, Jones and Montador, 1986; 
Marris, 1985; and Bispham, 1987). Whether or not the public debt 
calculus imposed a constraint on fiscal expansion in the United 
Kingdom was moreover the subject of considerable debate in that 
country in 1985. Whilst Congdon (1985a, 1985b, i985c) took the 
view that the United Kingdom was already in the so-called debt 
trap, Layard (1985), Charter for Jobs (1985), Dornbusch (1985), 
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Davies (i985) and Davies and Layard (1985) argued that the 
government could expand its borrowing in order to reduce the high 
level of unemployment. Budd, Dicks and Keating (1985) accepted 
that there was an optimal debt/GNP ratio, but did not venture to 
determine it. 
Table 1 Debt Service Burden on the General Government Sector: 
1970-85 
(Percentages of Nominal GNP) 
Debt Outstanding Gross Debt Interest Payments 
197U 1983 1970 1975 1980 1983 1984 1985 
United 
States 46 46 2,2 2,5 3, 3 4,6 4,9 5,5 
Japan 12 67 0, 6 1,2 3, 2 4,4 4,6 4,7 
Germany 18 41 1,0 1,4 1,9 3,0 3,0 3,0 
U Kingdom 86 54 3,9 4,0 5,6 4,9 4,7 4,3 
Italy 44 85 1,7 4,0 6,3 9,1 9,6 10, 1 
Austria 19 45 1,0 1,3 2,5 3,1 3,3 3,8 
Belgium 73 116 3,4 3,5 6,1 9,5 9,8 10, 1 
Netherlands 51 61 2,9 3,9 3,7 5,7 6, 2 6,5 
Source: OECD 1984, December, p. 32. 
The growing importance of public debt as a component of fiscal 
analysis is also demonstrated by the fact that a recent United 
Kingdom Green Paper on public expenditure devoted an entirely new 
section to the issue of public debt interest (United Kingdom, 
1984). In -the Netherlands, the role of the public debt as a 
determinant of the optimal budget deficit is dealt with in a 
recent report by the Sosiaal-Economische Raad (Netherlands, 
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1985). The exceptional rise in the United States public debt 
(held by the public), and the increase in interest costs in the 
budget, were also highlighted recently by a special study of 
these issues undertaken by the Congressional Budget Office 
(United States, 1984). 
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3. RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS 
In South Africa, as elsewhere, the so-called Keynesian revolution 
of the 1930s led to significant changes in thinking about the 
economic role of government deficits and public debt. The new 
attitude towards budget deficits and government borrowing, based 
on Keynesian principles of short-term demand management, was, 
inter alia, reflected in a changed framework of budgeting and 
budgetary presentation in South Africa in the post-1945 period. 
The process of adjustment of the format of the budget to the new 
Keynesian vision of how the economy worked, and the role of the 
budget in it, culminated in the abolition of the dual budgetary 
system which had been in existence since 1910, and the 
introduction of a so-called unitary budget over a decade ago. 
3.1 The Dual Budgetary System 
The so-called divided or dual budgetary system, which existed in 
South Africa from 1910 until its demise in the 1970s, was a 
reflection of the earlier, pre-Keynesian or classical attitudes 
towards the budget and public debt. In terms of this system, the 
central government's financial and budgetary accounts were 
divided into a so-called Revenue Account and a Loan Account (the 
smaller Bantu Education and South West Africa Accounts are not 
considered here). In general, the government's current 
expenditures were brought to account in the Revenue Account and 
financed from taxation and other current revenues, whilst capital 
expenditures and lending (i.e., permanent or recoverable 
expenditures) were brought to account in the Loan Account and 
financed from borrowing. 
Until at least the early post-1945 years this dual budgetary 
system, based on the nature of government spending, provided both 
a necessary and an adequate framework for the conduct of what 
were then considered to be sound financial policies. These 
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policies were based on the principle, accepted at an early stage 
in the development of public finance in South Africa, that 
responsible fiscal conduct demanded that at least current 
expenditure should be financed by current revenues, but that 
capital expenditure (i.e., productive outlays) could be financed 
from borrowing. In these early years the budgetary distinction 
between current and capital expenditure was therefore of vital 
interest. However, since the early 1950s there had been a 
gradual blurring of the division between the Revenue and Loan 
Accounts. This reflected, at least in part, the fact that the 
distinction between current and capital expenditure and revenue 
had become blurred and was fraught with definitional problems. 
An example was the difficulty of categorising mining leases. But 
the breakdown of the division also resulted from a weakening 
post-war resolve on the part of policy makers in South Africa to 
maintain the earlier dictums of sound finance against the 
onslaught of the new principle of functional finance with its 
emphasis on short-term demand management. For example, since 
1954 the Minister of Finance had purposefully proposed that 
surplus monies in the Revenue Account be transferred to the Loan 
Account. The reverse (i.e., loan financing of current 
expenditure) was on occasion achieved by re-defining certain 
current outlays as capital expenditures. The formal division 
between the Revenue and Loan Accounts therefore became largely 
meaningless. The final step on the road to a new style of 
budgetary presentation, based on the new Keynesian vision of the 
economy, was taken when, following the recommendations 01 the 
Franzsfen Commission in 1970, the distinction between the Revenue 
and Loan Accounts, and hence the underlying distinction between 
the central government's capital and current expenditures as a 
rationale for financial decisions, was formally abandoned in 1976 
in favour of a so-called unitary or undivided budgetary 
presentation, setting out total government spending, total 
revenues, and the overall deficit (surplus) and its; financing. 
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Apart from the obvious administrative advantages which must also 
have flowed from such a unification of the government's accounts, 
the introduction of a unitary budget served a twofold purpose; 
(1) to underline the importance of the concept of a consolidated 
budget deficit and the need to finance it in a non-inflationary 
way by integrating the government's borrowing with broad monetary 
policy, and (2; to promote the idea that the choice between 
taxation and borrowing should be based on so-called 'economic 
factors' such as the general state of economy, conditions in the 
money and capital markets, the balance of payments, etc., rather 
than on the type of expenditure to be undertaken. The eclipse of 
the longer-term dimensions of budgetary policy, which attracted 
so much attention in former times, by shorter-term issues was 
thus completed when the first of the so-called unitary budgets 
was introduced in Parliament in March 1976. 
3.2 A New Fiscal Constitution 
The Keynesian revolution and its South African corollary (i.e., 
the eventual collapse of the dual budgetary system) therefore 
changed the fiscal constitution of South Africa in an important 
respect. In terms of the Keynesian vision there were no longer 
considered to be any apparent traditional or constitutional 
constraints on the conduct of government finance or on the size 
and stability of government deficits. In other words, as 
elsewhere, the South African government assumed complete freedom 
to unbalance the overall budget on the basis of widely accepted 
Keynesian (demand management) principles. In short, by the 1970s 
the creation of open-ended budget deficits and borrowing, no 
longer related to or evaluated with reference to the government's 
assets or investments, had become normal and acceptable fiscal 
behaviour in South Africa in the interest of pursuing the macro-
economic .objectives of stability and growth. 
As the old budgetary system gradually disintegrated over the 
years and was replaced by a more modern (Keynesian) system of 
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a c c o u n t i n g and presentation, the earlier (i.e., classical) 
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h principles of sound government finance and the 
l o n g e r - t e r m implications of fiscal policy (e.g., the burden of 
the public debt, debt servicing costs and inter-generational 
equity) inevitably also faded in the public mind. Even the 
v i s i b l e signs of the older order disappeared. For example, 
r e f e r e n c e s to the burden of the public debt and the old rules of 
fiscal responsibility, which were still quite common in earlier 
post-War years, disappeared almost completely from Parliamentary 
debates during the 1 9 7 0 s . Moreover, the 'old fashioned' 
budgetary distinction between current and capital expenditure, 
epitomised by the distinction between the Revenue and Loan 
Accounts, which dominated budgetary policy in South Africa for so 
long, was dropped in favour of a new, low-profiled, 
classification of expenditure (to be voted on by Parliament) 
into: current expenditure, capital expenditure and transfers. As 
the transfers component of the total cut across the former 
division of outlays between the Revenue Account and the Loan 
Account, the new classification was not comparable with the old. 
In addition, the expenditure to "to be voted on by Parliament" 
excluded the so-called Statutory Appropriations, rendering the 
classifications not only confusing but also incomplete. 
Although a much more detailed economic (and functional) 
classification of government expenditure (not easily reconcilable 
with the aforementioned classification contained in the Estimate 
of Expenditure) was indeed supplied, the relevant table was 
relegated to a rather obscure part of the annual budget format 
(i.e., the statistical appendix). One could perhaps argue about 
the relative importance of these classifications in the budget's 
presentation since 1976, but there is no doubt that they have not 
played an important part in the determination of the government's 
fiscal stance since then. During the 1970s a familiar sign of 
the 'old order', i.e., the traditional annual statement by the 
Auditor-General on the so-called productive nature of the total 
outstanding public debt, also disappeared from the government's 
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(8 audited accounts.* 
Since the demise of the dual budgetary system in the 1970s, the 
annual budget document has accordingly provided few if any 
longer-term perspectives on the government's annual budgetary 
stance, and little to aid those who continued to look at the 
budget through classical eyes. Moreover, the annual budget 
presentation by the Minister of Finance continues to pay scant 
attention to the central government's outstanding debt, which 
plays such a key role in the determination of total government 
expenditures. 
3.3 Interest in Longer-term Issues 
There have been indications recently that some of the issues on 
which attention was focused in earlier years are once again 
regarded as legimate areas of concern in the discussion of fiscal 
policy in South Africa. Such concerns include, inter alia: the 
role of government interest payments as a cause of growing 
current expenditure; the so-called burden imposed on future 
generations by the large outstanding debt; and the short- and 
long-term implications of the financing of current expenditures 
by government borrowing (i.e., government dissaving). In its 
longer-term context, the latter issue in particular represents a 
resurrection, in a somewhat different guise, of the earlier, pre-
1976, issues surrounding the distinction between current and 
capital outlays. 
The loan financing of current outlays in particular has attracted 
a great deal of attention in South Africa since the early 1980s. 
As shown in Table 2, loan financing of current outlays first took 
place in the 1980s during the years 1983/84 and 1984/85. 
Criticism of government in this regard centres around two issues: 
(i) government appropriation of scarce private saving to finance 
current outlays could lower the growth rate of the economy by 
reducing the overall rate of productive investments, and (ii) the 
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future capacity of government to service debt may be impaired if 
the debt is created to finance unproductive outlays. 
Table 2 Central Government Outlays and Loan Financing, 1981-88 (r. Millions) 
year ending 
31 March 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 19a7 1988 ^  > 
Current 
Capital 
Total 
11 097 
2 546 
13 643 
13 962 
2 694 
16 65b 
lb 660 
3 000 
ly 660 
20 183 
3 662 
23 845 
25 100 
2 773 
27 874 
29 775 
3 200 
32 97b 
35 126 
5 08b 
4u 213 
41 682 
4 636 
4b 318 
Loan 
financiny; 551 2 345 2 373 4 587 4 351 4 478 4 351 8 425 
Sources: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin. (Various issues) 
The South African Reserve Bank. 
Statistical/Economic Reviews. Budget 1986/87 and Budget 1987/88. 
Notes: (1) Budget estimates. 
(2; Actual Exchequer deficits, except 1987/88. 
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The government responded to these criticisms by appearing to 
adopt a more cautious if somewhat hypocritical attitude towards 
the issue in question. For example, it was stated in the 1985 
budget that "current" expenditure would not again be financed by 
borrowing, as had happened in 1983 and 1984. As Table 2 shows, 
the realised budget deficit in fiscal year 1985/86 again exceeded 
the government's capital expenditure, by approximately R1 200 
million. 
In the same vein, it was declared in the 1986 budget that "as a 
further discipline the government's total borrowing requirement 
has been kept below the total intended capital spending for 1986-
87". However, there was no statistical backup in the budget to 
substantiate this statement. At the same time, the budget 
actually also questioned the appropriateness of the usual 
national accounting distinction between capital and current 
expenditure. The question is, why did the government accept a 
discipline on itself which was, by its own admission, based on 
inapplicable national accounting concepts and, moreover, was not 
easily attainable in the then current phase of the business 
cycle? 
The government's battle to come to grips with the issue in 
question must be assessed against the background of three main 
arguments against any dogmatic adherence to a policy of "no loan 
financing of current outlays". Firstly, at a time when the 
private demand for loanable funds is low relative to supply, it 
is legitimate and desirable for the public authorities to off-set 
the private excess of savings over investment by incurring larger 
budget deficits (irrespective of their composition), subject only 
to balance of payments considerations. The data in Table 2 must 
therefore be assessed against the background of the severe 
recession through which the South African economy has passed in 
the 1980s and the obligation that the government has to support 
demand. 
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Secondly, there is no generally accepted way that one can draw a 
valid distinction between truly productive and truly unproductive 
government outlays at this juncture of South Africa's history. 
The traditional national accounting distinction between 
investment and consumption may be appropriate for the private 
sector but is definitely not appropriate in respect of many of 
the traditional functions performed by the public sector, i.e., 
education, social welfare, research, health, etc. Even outlays 
on the development and production of armaments may directly or 
indirectly stimulate improvements in productivity (e.g., witness 
the successes of Armscor). 
Lastly, longer-term budgetary issues such as these are in any 
case best evaluated in a longer-term context. As it is the trend 
of deficits or debt accumulation rather than the annual figures 
which serve as an indicator of fiscal discipline, an evaluation 
of the budget needs to distinguish between longer-term trends and 
purely short-term and reversible departures from the trend. The 
reason is that a short-term departure from a norm may not give 
cause for concern or have undesirable expectational consequences 
if it is expected to be merely temporary and will soon be 
reversed. Thus, temporary increases in the overall budget 
deficit or temporary loan-financing of 'current expenditure1 when 
the economy is weak may to some extent be off-set when the 
economy is strong, and may be quite acceptable in a medium-term 
context. Since the South African budget has a very short-term 
focus it stands to reason that a norm which has a medium-term 
orientation will not fit easily into its framework. 
The 1987 budget, which raised the overall deficit substantially 
above its level in the previous year, failed to mention the 
distinction between current and capital expenditure and its 
financing. As shown in Table 2, the Finance Minister actually 
proposed to use approximately R4 000 million of borrowed funds to 
finance a part of "current outlays" over the budget period, 
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thereby unfortunately creating the perception that the government 
is treating its own declared norms in a somewhat undiscipiine(J 
manner. 
Thus far attempts to give the annual budget a longer-term 
orientation have been fitful. The 1985 budget included a section 
on "longer-term fiscal and monetary policy". This latter section 
stipulated, inter alia, that "total public sector spending" as a 
percentage of GDP was to be brought down to its 1981 level by 
1990, and that the deficit before borrowing of the "government 
sector" was not in future years to exceed 3 per cent of GDP, 
barring highly unusual circumstances. In the event, the 1985 
budget provided for a deficit before borrowing on the state 
Revenue Account alone of about 2,2 per cent of GDP. There was, 
however, no indication of how much of a contribution the central 
government's deficit was expected to make towards keeping the 
deficit before borrowing of the "government sector" as a whole 
within the 3 per cent of GDP limit. The 1986 budget likewise 
failed to throw any light on this puzzle. 
In a further development the 1986 budget effectively pushed into 
the background again, if not actually abandoned, the Finance 
Minister's previously declared medium-term objective of reducing 
public-sector spending as a percentage of GDP to its 1981 level, 
by declaring that it "will be more difficult to realise, at any 
rate in the following few years". 
On the positive side, however, the 1985 budget for the first time 
gave a breakdown of the total of transfer payments into capital 
and current outlays. As this move will make it easier for the 
budget user to estimate the government's total capital 
expenditure, it could perhaps be seen as an indication of the 
government's willingness to recognise and encourage any renewed 
interest in the structural aspects of the budget deficit and to 
facilitate its evaluation. 
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4. THE FISCAL CALCULUS 
This section .sets out the analytics of the so-called fiscal 
calculus as' it applies to the mechanical relation between the 
budget and the debt/GNP ratio. Further aspects of the debt 
calculus will be presented in other relevant parts of the paper. 
The precise manner in which annual budget deficits and debt in 
relation to the GNP interact depends in a very complex way on 
the rate of growth of the nominal GNP and the interest rate on 
the outstanding debt. The projections provided in Section 8 
below are based on the specifications provided by Bispham, 1987. 
The major conclusions emerging from Bispham's presentation are 
( 9 ) summarised below. 
An important result emerging from the debt calculus is that a 
budget deficit per se does not necessarily produce an "explosive" 
debt situation (i.e., an ever-expanding ratio of debt to GNP), 
even when the deficit is entirely debt financed. Taking the 
simplest case first, a constant overall budget deficit/GNP ratio, 
(i.e., where no interest is paid, or debt interest payments are 
off-set entirely by changes in the non-interest deficit) will be 
associated with the following upper limit of the debt/GNP ratio: 
D e b t t = b t a > 
GNPt y 
where y = the nominal growth rate of GNP 
b t = the constant overall budget deficit as a proportion 
of GNP. 
In these circumstances the conditions for stability of the 
debt/GNP ratio can be described as follows. The debt/GNP ratio 
will remain constant at any given level when the outstanding debt 
increases at the same rate as nominal income. This will occur 
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when the budget deficit ratio equals the fall in the debt ratio 
caused by the growth of GNP, i.e., when 
Dt = ° l_i_) (2) 
GNP0 1 + y 
If the budget deficit exceeds this steady-state level, that ratio 
will increase, though it would stabilise at a new ceiling. 
Where interest is paid on the outstanding debt and the resulting 
expenditures are not off-set by changes in other expenditure or 
revenues in order to maintain a constant deficit ratio, a 
potential for the existence of "explosive" situations exist. 
Then the crucial distinction between "explosive" and "non-
explosive" debt situations is between those situations in which 
the growth rate of nominal (or real) GNP is less than, equal to 
or greater than the nominal (or real) interest rate on the 
outstanding government debt. Provided the same price index is 
used to deflate nominal GNP as is used to calculate the real 
interest rate, the same situations may be distinguished using the 
real equivalents as when nominal values are used. In the actual 
calculations in Section 8, nominal values are used, although 
prospective consumer price indexes are used in order to build up 
the estimated future growth rates of nominal GNP. 
The relevant interest rate ~is sometimes taken to be the "net of 
tax (paid by the bondholders) rate" as this would be the 
appropriate rate to use in order to measure net budgetary effects 
(Bispham, 1987, p.42). In that case the non-interest budget 
deficit (non-interest expenditures less revenues) would exclude 
tax on government interest payments. Other writers (e.g. 
Chouraqui, Jones and Montador, 1986, p.67) assumed the interest 
rate to be gross of tax paid on government stock. However, it 
should be noted that the latter approach implies that tax on 
interest would be an increasing proportion of total tax revenue 
as the debt/GNP ratio rises. 
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T h e foregoing distinction between "gross" and "net of tax" 
interest rates does not affect the analytics that follow below, 
in the actual calculations of prospective debt and uebt service 
ratios in Section 8 below, gross (i.e., before tax) interest 
rates w .11 oe used. 
The analytics of the aforementioned key connection between the 
growth rate and the interest rate may be summarised as follows. 
With q representing the constant primary budget deficit expressed 
as a proportion of GNP, y the annual growth rate of nominal GNP, 
r ( 1 0 / the interest rate, and DebtQ/GNP0 the initial debt ratio, 
the debt/GNP ratio will evolve as follows: 
For all r f y: 
D e U tt = q ^ , n ^ V - l l ( i ^ V (3) 
GNP T r-y I 1+y J G N P 0 1+y 
But tor r = y 
D e b tt = tq + D e b t o (4) 
GNP T GNPq 
The evolution of the debt/GNP ratio when t oo will thus depend 
crucially on the relationship between y and r, i.e., 
when r = y 
D e b t t « tq + D e b t o ->0C as t-voo 
GNPt GNPq 
and when r < y : 
then <1 
1+y 
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1 + r 
thus (___)t 0 as t 
1+y 
therefore D e b t t -» q ( 1 + V ) as t-»oo 
GNPt y-r 
This demonstrates that whilst the distinction between nominal and 
real GNP and interest rates is not relevant in respect of the 
distinction between "explosive" and "non-explosive" situations, 
the growth rate of nominal GNP helps to determine the level of 
the steady-state equilibrium debt/GNP ratio. 
For r>y: 
then 1 + r >1 
1+, 
therefore D e b tt-»ooas t-*oo 
GNPt 
The direction of the "explosion" will, nowever, depend on the signs 
of D e b t o and q, as well as on their relative magnitudes. 
GNP 0 
This can be explained as follows: 
Equation (3) can be restated as follows: 
^ t _ q {l+y, {l+r ) t - q + ^ o (3b, 
GNPt r-y i+y r-y GNPQ x+y 
As the middle term is a constant it can be ignored. 
With D e b t o and q both positive, D e b t t will obviously increase 
GNPq GNPt 
indefinitely. However, if q is negative (i.e., if there is a 
primary surplus), tuen the two "explosive" terms in equation (3b; 
will pull in opposite directions. D e b t t will either "explode" 
GNPt 
(increase without limit), or "implode" (decrease towards an 
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i n f i n i t e accumulation of net assets) according to whether: 
r-y 
is smaller or larger than Debt, 
GWP, 
Only if t h e absolute values of the two terms were exactly equal 
would D e b t t remain constant. As discussed below, the two terms 
GNPt 
thus combine to define a so-called "threshold" primary surplus to 
stabilise the debt/GNP ratio. 
It follows from the above that the conditions for stability of 
the debt/GNP ratio can be expressed in terms of two key 
statistics: (1) The primary fiscal deficit, and (2) The 
difference between the growth rate of nominal GNP and the 
interest rate on the outstanding debt, i.e., the so-called 
growth-interest differential. To illustrate this, Chart A gives 
the effect of various combinations of the values of these two 
statistics on the value of the debt/GNP ratio. 
Chart A* 
The Debt/GHP Ratio : Conditions for Stability 
Primary Budget Balance 
Surplus (-) o Deficit (+) 
•M w tt) rH m m 0) 
V +J a a •H (1) I U 
si a) -P <w 
o -H ^ T) u 
y - r = + 
r = 0 
y - r = -
* Adapted from Johnson, 1985. 
The simplest case occurs when the primary deficit is assumed to 
be zero, and the growth rate of nominal GNP and the interest rate 
are the same (i.e., the growth interest differential = oi, then 
the debt/GNP ratio remains constant. When the growth rate of GNP 
is higher than the interest rate (i.e. the growth-interest 
differential is positive) a constant primary deficit ratio (+) 
will not be explosive but will be associated with the following 
asymptotic debt ratio (as already shown above): 
D e b t t _ q 
GNPt y-r 
This steaoy-state debt ratio will be higher, the smaller the 
positive growth-interest differential. The actual debt ratio 
will tend to rise or fall according to whether it is below or 
above this long-term equilibrium ratio. The overall budget 
defict itself will not remain a constant proportion of GNP, but 
will head for a new equilibrium level, where it will equal the 
sum of the constant primary deficit plus interest on the 
equilibrium debt. Expressed as a proportion of GNP, the overall 
budget deficit ratio (bt, will approach the following ceiling: 
bt = q ( 1 +y) r+q (5) 
y-r 
Conversely, a primary surplus (-) and a growth rate higher than 
the interest rate (i.e., a positive growth-interest differential) 
will make the debt/GNP ratio fall, in the direction of a finite 
accumulation of net assets. 
The obvious conclusion is that as long as the growth-interest 
differential is positive, the debt situation remains "non-
explosive", in the sense that tne debt/GNP ratio wilj. not 
rise/fall explosively to an infinite level. As we have seen, the 
actual debt ratio will rise or fall depending on whether it is 
above or below the long-term equilibrium ratio. 
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However, once the interest rate is equal to, or greater than the 
growth rate of nominal GNP, the debt situation becomes 
potentially "explosive", although the direction of the explosion 
can be either way. 
Where r = y the interest component of the budget deficit grows at 
the same rate as nominal GNP; it therefore has no effect on the 
debt/GNP ratio, whatever its level, and it is only the primary 
budget position that affects this ratio: as shown in Chart A, 
where the primary budget balance is neither in surplus nor in 
deficit, the outstanding debt will grow at the same rate as the 
GNP, so the debt/GNP ratio will be stable at whatever level it 
happens to be at any particular point in time. However, a 
primary deficit (+> will cause the debt/GNP ratio to increase 
"explosively" when the growth-interest differential is zero, and 
a surplus (-) will make the debt ratio fall to an infinite 
accumulation of assets. 
A negative growth-interest differential unambiguously gives rise 
to an "explosive" situation, although the direction of the 
"explosion" could be either way. However, a primary surplus and 
an interest rate higher than the growth rate will give rise to 
the existence of so-called knife-edge cases, where the debt 
situation is delicately balanced. In this situation, the 
debt/GNP ratio would grow without limit if the primary budget 
surplus (q) is below a certain threshold level, where the latter 
is 
q = PebtQ (r-y ) { 6 ) 
G N P q 1+y 
If the primary surplus is above this threshold level, the 
government will eventually accumulate infinite assets. It 
follows that for the actual debt/GNP ratio to remain stable 
(i.e., constant), the primary budget must be sufficiently in 
surplus, and the actual ratio will rise or fall depending on 
whether the primary surplus is below or above the threshold. 
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5. THE GROWTH OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S TOTAL DEBT: 
1960-1987 
The purpose of this section is to describe: (1) the growth of the 
State Debt between 1960 and 1987; (2, the factors that 
contributed to that growth; and (3; the growth of the 
government's (gross) debt service burden. 
5.i Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues 
As discussed in Section 1.3, the budget referred to in this study 
is the central government's budget, as it is customarily presented 
to Parliament by the Minister of Finance. From an accounting 
point of view, the budget is based on the so-called State Revenue 
Account, currently representing one of four separate accounts in 
the State Revenue Fund (the Fund's banking equivalent is the 
Exchequer Account). 
Strictly speaking, the central government's budget currently 
comprises the general affairs budget, controlled by the Minister 
of Finance, as well as the three sub-budgets presented to 
Parliament by, respectively, the Ministers of the Budget of the 
three Houses of Parliament. However, the separate Ministers 
Councils' "own" expenditures are currently so closely related to 
amounts allocated to them from the centralised general affairs 
budget, and their "own" revenues are as yet so small that a 
consolidation of the four budgets would not differ much from the 
Finance Minister's budget on its own. The Finance Minister's 
budget will thus be used synonymously with the Central 
Government's overall budget. The latter in turn will be taken 
to be equivalent to the annual receipts, issues and deficits on 
the combined Exchequer Account. Indeed, it is this latter 
account, as the main generator of debt, which stands at the 
centre of' the present study, and from now on "the budget" and 
"the Exchequer Account" will be used synonymously. 
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Given the scope and coverage of the central government's budget, 
as defined above, the deficit before borrowing is defined as 
expenditure (including net government lending) minus revenues. 
The corresponding gross debt concept is the so-called State Debt, 
as defined in Section 1.3. In other words, the outstanding State 
Debt represents, with minor qualifications, the cumulative effect 
of debt issued (less redemptions) to finance past annual 
Exchequer deficits. Such a debt concept would obviously include 
debt held internally by government departments, including the 
Paymaster-General. 
The aforementioned gross concepts may be contrasted with the 
corresponding net budgetary and debt concepts. The net debt of 
the central government is conceptually equal to the State's gross 
financial liabilities (i.e., the State Debt) minus its financial 
assets. The budget deficit which is conceptually consistent with 
this net debt concept, and which reflects the net borrowing of 
the government in each period, would thus be defined as follows: 
government expenditure (excluding net government lending) minus 
tax revenues, i.e., the net financial balance of the government. 
The net debt would obviously come closer to reflecting the total 
of past deficits in those countries where the government's net 
financial balance is considered to be more relevant than the 
government's gross borrowing. In South Africa it is however the 
gross debt and the deficit before (gross) borrowing which has 
traditionally been the focus of attention in the evaluation of 
fiscal policy. 
It is especially when making inter-country comparisons of debt 
ratios and debt service burdens that a net measure is regarded as 
best because of the large differences between countries in the 
amount of financial intermediation (Marris, 1985, p.328). In 
some respects a net concept of debt might also be more 
appropriate than the gross debt for a study of the past and 
future evolution of the South African debt situation. The 
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central government's intermediary role has traditionally been a 
very substantial one in the sense that the government has been a 
relatively large borrower on behalf of individuals and 
institutions in both the private and broad public sectors. When 
the government borrows on behalf of others the loans increase the 
State's gross financial liabilities and interest costs but the 
State also acquires financial claims or assets, the interest on 
which represents a legitimate offset against its interest 
payments on the gross debt. To ignore these accumulated 
financial assets and the corresponding flow of interest/dividend 
income would be to distort the State's true financial position. 
More importantly, it would exaggerate the government's present 
and future debt service burden. On the other hand, the South 
African government's role as a financial intermediary has over 
the last decade showed signs of diminishing, mainly as a result 
of the granting of "own" borrowing powers to organisations such 
as SATS, the Department of Posts and Telecommunications and other 
state enterprises. 
Moreover, a particular advantage of working with the gross debt 
in South Africa is that data is more readily available and thus 
more highly publicised. Gross debt figures are also more 
directly comparable with published gross interest payments and 
other direct costs of raising loans. In South Africa, the gross 
debt also reflects the cumulative effect of past Exchequer 
deficits, defined as the deficit before borrowing. In contrast, 
the concept "Net financial balance", referred to above, does not 
enjoy a high profile in this country. 
In the discussion to follow, reference will be made to both gross 
and net debt. However, because of the relatively close link 
between budget deficits and the gross debt, only the latter will 
be used for the forward - looking fiscal projections in Section 
8 . 
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5.2 Growth of the Total State Debt: 1960-87 
At the end of 1946 the total State Debt equalled Rl,lbl million. 
However, over the next 14 years this total had more than doubled 
to R2 463 million. Table 3 shows the further growth of the total 
debt until 1987. 
Between 1960 and 1987, (i.e., after a further 27 years), the 
gross outstanding debt had grown almost twenty-fold to R47 619 
million- Since 1982 the total debt had once again more than 
doubled. 
5.3 Causes of Annual Movements in the Total Debt 
The growth of the total debt between 1960 and 1987 and annual 
movements in the total can be attributed to several objective 
factors, including (1) annual budget deficits, (2) changes in the 
government's cash balances, 13) net transfers to the 
Stabilisation Account, (4) adjustments for changes in foreign 
exchange rates, (5> IMF loan transactions, and (6) cancellations 
of debt. Table 4 provides data indicating the role played by 
these factors during the period in question. 
Budget Deficits 
Budget deficits (i.e., Exchequer deficits) emerge from Table 4 as 
historically the most important cause of the long-term growth in 
the outstanding gross State Debt, having accounted for no less 
than 89 per cent of the cumulative increase in the total debt 
between 1960 and 1987. The central government not only ran 
deficits in every year covered by the table, but thjse deficits 
also increased from an average of R189 million in the period 
1960/61 1966/67 to R6 903 million in 1986/87. 
However, as the size of budget deficits is influenced by the 
effect of inflation on budget aggregates, as well as by other 
structural and cyclical factors, deficits are best analysed in a 
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longer-terra context in relation to GNP. Table 5 shows that 
deficits as a proportion of GNP were on a rising trend between 
1960 and 1979, increasing from an average of 1,94 per cent during 
the period 1960/61 - 1963/64 to an average of 4,86 per cent over 
the period 1971/72 to 1978/79. However, this rising trend w a s 
reversed in the 1980s, especially during the earlier part of the 
decade. More will be said about this at a later stage. 
Table 5 Exchequer Deficits as a Ratio of GNP, 1960-87 
Year ending 
31 March 
% Year ending 
31 March 
% 
1961 1, 3b 1975 3,43 
1962 2,27 1976 5,12 
1963 2, 33 1977 6, 62 
1964 1,77 1978 5,99 
1965 3,83 1979 5, 58 
1966 3,60 1980 3,89 
1967 4,08 1981 0, 93 
1968 3, 53 1982 3,49 
1969 3,84 1983 3, 11 
1970 3,46 1984 5,37 
1971 3,42 1985 4, 32 
1972 5, 84 1986 3,94 
1973 4, 14 1987 5, 18 
1974 2, 14 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, 
(various issues). 
Quarterly Bulletin, 
Changes in the Government's Cash Balances 
Table 4 shows that the year-on-year growth rate of the State Debt 
since 1960 was also influenced by fluctuations in the 
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g o v e r n m e n t ' s cash balances. Whilst the government may in a 
particular year borrow more than what is needed to finance a 
s h o r t f a l l in the Exchequer, accumulated cash surpluses may be 
u s e d i n subsequent years to reduce the need to borrow. In 
addition cash balances may temporarily dam up in the Paymaster-
General Account. For these reasons alone there is unlikely to be 
an exact correspondence between Exchequer deficits and annual 
increments in the State Debt. In the medium to longer-term, 
however, one would expect the correspondence to be much closer, 
and even in the very short-term the discrepancies ought not 
normally to be very large. As reflected by Table 4, cash 
accumulated in the Exchequer Account and the Paymaster-General 
Account between 1960 and 1987 accounted for a total increase in 
outstanding debt of R880 million. This latter total was however 
accumulated almost entirely during the last three or four years, 
beginning more or less with the dormancy of the Stabilisation 
Account, as described below. 
The Stabilisation Account 
The operation of the Stabilisation Account since the middle of 
the 1960s has effectively permitted the Treasury at times to 
borrow far in excess of its own direct budgetary needs and to 
sterilise the proceeds in the interest of monetary policy. The 
Stabilisation Account has therefore helped to break the close 
link that might have existed between Exchequer deficits and the 
outstanding debt. 
Table 4 shows that transfers to and from the Stabilisation 
Account occurred on a relatively modest scale during both the 
1960s and 1970s. By contrast, fairly substantial amounts were 
involved during the first half of the 1980s, and a rapid build-up 
of cash in the Account consequently occurred. At the end of 
March 1983 the amount standing to the credit of the Account 
totalled R3,095 million or 11,69 per cent <•" the total 
outstanding State Debt at that stage.^11' 
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Because of the accumulations on the Stabilisation Account, 
increases in debt outstripped budget deficits by substantial 
amounts, especially during 1980/81 and 1982/83; conversely, in 
the following year the growth of debt was substantially less than 
what it would have been otherwise, as a substantial transfer from 
the Stabilisation Account occurred. By the end of March 1985 
however, the amount on the Account had been reduced to NIL, and 
the Account has been dormant since then. The rapid reduction in 
the balance on the Stabilisation Account was achieved as follows. 
Outstanding interest-free advances from the Account to the 
National Supplies Procurement Fund, amounting to approximately 
R2,0 million, were converted into permanent capital with effect 
from 1 April 1984. The amount concerned was therefore written 
out of the Stabilisation Account, which implied that the 
mechanism created by the latter account was effectively employed, 
with retroactive effect, to finance additional extra-budgetary 
outlays, thus bypassing the usual budgetary procedures. 
On the information available, and taking the 27-year period from 
1960/61 to 1986/87 as a whole, the financing of extra-budgetary 
expenditure through the medium of the Stabilisation Account 
therefore contributed to the growth of the state Debt to the 
tune of R2 206 million. Whether or not the Account contributed 
indirectly to a further overall increase in the total outstanding 
debt between 1968 and 1985 on account of the need to finance the 
additional interest costs, depends on the extent to which the 
latter was off-set by any interest earned on the investment of 
balances on the Account. To give a precise answer to this 
question would require detailed investigation; however, two 
points may be underlined in that connection: (1) as the amounts 
on the Stabilisation Account were frequently utilized to finance 
temporary liquidity shortages in the Exchequer, this would have 
helped to reduce implicitly the government's gross interest 
costs; and (2) whilst the advances referred to above, (i.e., to 
the National Supplies Procurement Fund) were in fact interest 
free, the advances in question may have served as a substitute 
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for more expensive private credit. Both these factors would have 
tended to reduce the net cost to the Exchequer of operating the 
Stabilization Account. 
(3; Adjustments for Foreign Exchange Rate Changes 
Adjustments of the outstanding debt in respect of foreign 
exchange rate changes were especially significant during the 
1980s when exchange rates were particularly volatile. The 
government's gross outstanding foreign debt, measured in Rands, 
increased from R730 million at the end of March 1980 to R3 220 
million at the end of March 1987. When the currencies of the 
creditor countries appreciate against the Rand, the outstanding 
debt, measured in Rands, rises and vice versa. Table 4, 
reflecting these valuation adjustments since 1972/73, shows that 
over the period as a whole valuation adjustments account for 
Rl 645 million or 3,6 per cent of the increase in the outstanding 
debt. However, between 1980 and 1987, valuation adjustments 
accounted for no less than Rl 511 million or 5,13 per cent of the 
increase in the Rand value of the total debt of the central 
government. 
IMF Loan Transactions 
Table 4 also reveals the effect of IMF loans transactions on the 
outstanding State Debt between 1982 and 1987. Prior to 1982, the 
proceeds of IMF loans were utilized in the financing of budget 
deficits; however, as from 1982 the Rand counterpart of IMF 
loans has not been spent: instead, the proceeds of the loans, 
while raising the outstanding State Debt, have been placed on 
deposit with the Reserve Bank and has thus effectively been 
sterilized. Conversely, repayments of such loans by the Treasury 
represent a decline in the outstanding State Debt, without 
reducing the availability of budgetary funds, because 
corresponding transfers are made to the Exchequer from the IMF 
deposit account with the Reserve Bank. As the IMF loan 
negotiated by the South African Government in fiscal year 1982/83 
had not yet been fully repaid by 1987, its contribution to the 
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total debt over this perioa was positive, albeit quite small. 
The Cancellation of Debt 
Prior to the closing of the General Sinking Fund (which had 
existed since 1926) in fiscal year 1983/84, the State had made 
regular but small revenue transfers to that Fund for the purchase 
of government securities, to be cancelled on maturity. Such 
cancellations were never large, and amounted to approximately R7 
million per annum over the last four years of the existence of 
the Fund However, the latter was dis established in fiscal year 
1983/84 and debt amounting to R129 million was consequently 
cancelled in that year. As snown in Table 4, the cancellation of 
debt by the General Sinking Fund amounted to only R233 million 
over the 27 year period as a whole. 
5.4 Gross Debt Service Costs 
Debt service costs comprise mainly interest and discounts on 
government securities.^^) They represent a category of 
government spending over whicn the fiscal planners have no direct 
budgetary control in the short to medium-term, because the volume 
of outstanding debt and the average interest rate on tne total 
debt represent the cumulative effect of past fiscal, monetary and 
debt management policies. Rising interest payments as a ratio of 
GNP will act as a constraint on the flexibility and stability of 
budgetary policy by increasing the squeeze on other components ol 
the budget just to maintain a given ratio of expenditures to GNP. 
Moreover, a large or increasing share oi interest in total 
outlays will reduce the flexibility of government outlays, thus 
marking it more difficult to reduce total outlays, in a recession 
when revenues fall or when it is a longer-term aim of the 
government to reduce the level of taxation. 
Table 6 shows the evolution of the gross debt service costs of 
the State since 1960, in absolute terms and relative to GNP and 
the budget. Over the 26 year period debt service costs increased 
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Table 6 The Central Government's Debt Service Costs: 1961-1987 
Year 
Interest Payments^1^ 
ending 
31 March 
Total 
Percentages of 
RM Exchequer Receipts GNP 
1961 98 12, 3 1,9 
1962 108 13, 3 2,0 
1963 110 12, 2 1,9 
1964 119 11,4 1,9 
1965 129 10, 9 1,8 
1966 144 11,1 1,9 
1967 165 11,5 2,0 
1968 200 12, 1 2,1 
1969 243 14,4 2,4 
1970 279 13, 0 2, 5 
1971 293 12, 6 2,4 
1972 336 12, 3 2,5 
1973 390 12, 3 2, 5 
1974 468 11, 2 2,4 
1975 494 10, 1 2,1 
1976 562 10, 0 2, 2 
1977 733 11, 8 2,5 
1978 890 12, 6 2,7 
1979 1 150 14, 1 3,0 
1980 1 317 13, 3 2,9 
1981 1 428 10, 7 2,4 
1982 1 951 13,4 2,9 
1983 2 475 ^  ! 14, 3 3, 2 
1984 3 439'^ ) 17,9 4,0 
1985 4 567 19, 3 4,6 
1986 5 052 17, 0 4,5 
1987 5 979 17,3 4,5 
Source: (1 / South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, 
(various issues). 
(2) Republic of South Africa, Part 1 of the Reports of 
the Auditor-General (Government Printer: Pretoria), 
1961-1987 
Notes: ^1) Including discounts on government securities. 
(2) Includes small amounts of interent paid in respect 
of loans to Community Councils. 
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uninterruptedly from R98 million in 1960/61 to R5 979 million in 
1986/87. Their importance in the economy has likewise increased 
steadily from 2,04 per cent of GNP in the 1960s to 3,72 per cent 
in the 1980s. 
However, the ratio of debt costs to GNP increased substantially 
from less than 3 per cent during 1980/81 and 1981/82 to an 
average of approximately 4,5 per cent during the period 1982/83 
to 1986/87. As a result, the importance of the gross debt 
service burden in the annual budget has also increased 
considerably over the last six years, from 10,7 per cent of 
Exchequer receipts in 1980/81 to 17,3 per cent in 1986/87. As a 
percentage of current outlays, the debt service burden increased 
from 12,9 per cent in 1980/81 to 17,0 per cent in 1986/87, as is 
shown in Table 7. 
Table 8 moreover shows that the annual growth of gross interest 
costs during the period 1980/81-1986/87 far exceeded the growth 
of the other components of spending (i.e., current and capital), 
except in 1985/86 and 1986/87. 
Table 7 The Central Government's Gross Debt Service Costs 
as a Ratio of Current and Total Outlays 
Year ending 
31 March 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Percentages 
Current Outlays 
Total Outlays 
12, 9 
10, 5 
14, 0 
11,7 
14, 9 
12,6 
17,0 
14, 4 
18, 2 
16,4 
17,0 
15,3 
17,0 
14,9 
Source: South African Reserve Bank. 
Republic of South Africa, Statistical Economic Review, 
The Budget Speech 1987/88 (Government Printer: W.P.B. -
1987;. 
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Table 8 Annual Changes in Government Outlays : 1982-1987 
Year ending 
31 March 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Percentages 
1 
Current Outlays 
Interest 
Other 
36, 6 
24, 2 
26,9 
18, 1 
39,0 
18,0 
32, 8 
22,6 
10, 6 
20,4 
18, 4 
13,8 
Total 
Capital Outlays 
25,8 
5,8 
19, 3 
11,4 
21, 2 
22, 1 
24,4 
-24, 3 
18,6 
15,4 
18,0 
59,0 
Total Outlays 22, 1 18, 0 21,3 16, 9 18, 3 22, 0 
Source: As for Table 7 
Rising gross debt interest costs were clearly one of the 
determinants of the relatively high rate of increase in 
spending between 1980 and 1987. 
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6. EVOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S GROSS 
DEBT/GNP RATIO : 1960-1987 
6.1 Introduction 
As we have seen, the conditions for stability of government debt 
in relation to GNP can be expressed in terms of two sets of data: 
11) the growth-interest differential (y - r); and (2) the primary 
(non-interest; budget deficit. In particular, the debt/GNP 
ratio is "non-explosive" as long as the growth-interest 
differential is positive. However, the situation is potentially 
"explosive" when y < r, and the stability of the debt situation 
of a country then depends crucially on the size of the primary 
deficit. 
By the mid-1980s many countries faced a negative growth-interest 
differential. For such countries the size of their primary 
deficits was therefore absolutely crucial. In some countries an 
"explosive" situation still exists, with the outstanding debt 
likely to grow indefinitely as a ratio of GNP, unless budget 
deficits are lowered drastically. 
By comparison, the gross debt/GNP ratio in South Africa was on a 
declining trend between 1960 and the early 1980s, and recently 
showed signs of stabilising at between 35 per cent and 36 per 
cent. However, escalating budget deficits and debt service costs 
suggest that South Africa's overall debt situation might in 
reality be deteriorating, and that if present trends continued, 
the government's debt and interest costs could rise to 
unacceptable levels in the longer-term. in particular, the 
question arises whether recent and expected increases in the 
outstanding debt pose a threat to the future flexibility and 
stability of budgetary policy. 
This section reviews the historical evolution of South Africa's 
gross debt/GNP ratio between 1960 and 1987, against which the 
50 
forward-looking fiscal calculus will be undertaken in Section 8. 
6.2 Movements in the Debt/GNP Ratio s 1960-1987 
Table 9 shows the evolution of the debt/GNP ratio between 1960 
and 1987, and reveals that, despite the rapid growth of the 
nominal Rand value of the debt, the ratio of debt to GNP actually 
fell from 51,84 per cent in 1960 to 35,76 per cent in 1987. 
Whilst the ratio fluctuated between 44 per cent and 48 per cent 
in the 1960s and early 1970s, it thereafter declined still 
further to an average of 40,14 per cent in the late 1970s. 
A close scrutiny of the 1980s reveals in addition that the ratio 
of debt to GNP fell dramatically from 42,89 per cent in 1979 to 
32,80 per cent in 1982, but thereafter remained fairly stable at 
approximately 35-36 per cent between 1983 and 1987. 
The following section sets out the simple analytics of changes in 
the debt/GNP ratio. 
6.3 The Analytics of Changes in the Debt/GNP Ratio^13) 
year-to-year changes in the debt/GNP ratio are defined as: 
where y = the growth rate of nominal GNP. 
Equating D e b t t - D e b tt-1 with bfc (defined as the budged deficit 
GNPt 
expressed as a ratio of GNP - it is thus assumed that there is a 
direct one-to-one relationship between the budget deficit and the 
total debt), this gives: 
Debtt Debt,..! _ Debtt_x -y + ^Debtt_x 
GNPt GNP^-i GNP|-_i 1+y GNP,. 
Debtt_Debtt_^ 
Debtt_x (1+y) 
(1; 
D e b t t _ » e b tt-l = D e b tt-1 ( - Y ) + b t 
GNPt GNPt_x GNPt_x 1+y 
 (2) 
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Table 9 Evolution of the State Debt/GNP Ratio: 1960-1987 
(Percentages) 
ir ending 
March 
Debt/GNP ratio*1' Year ending 
31 March 
Debt/GNP ratio*1) 
1960 51, 84 1974 40, 54 
1961 50, 00 1975 36, 03 
1962 49, 57 1976 38, 90 
1963 48, 72 1977 40, 26 
1964 46, 30 1978 42, 69 
1965 45,83 1979 42, 89 
1966 44,23 1980 39, 79 
1967 45, 11 1981 33, 49 
1968 45, 02 1982 32, 80 
1969 48, 33 1983 34, 70 
1970 45,96 1984 35, 74 
1971 43, 96 1984 36, 19 
1972 44, 86 1986 36, 15 
1973 46, 05 1987 35, 76 
Notes: (1) Calculated by dividing total debt at end March by 
GNP of last completed calendar year. 
Sources: Table. 4 
South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, (various 
issues). 
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Equation (2) divides year-to-year changes in the debt/GNP ratio 
into those arising from the budget deficit as a ratio of GNP, bt, 
and those arising from the growth of GNP, y. The debt/GNP ratio 
remains constant when the budget deficit ratio equals the fall in 
the debt ratio caused by the growth of GNP, i.e., 
Debt,. Debt(-_i - i-i = 0 when: 
GNPt GNPfl 
D e b tt-1 t -Y}= - b t (3) 
GNPt_i 1+y 
It follows from equation [3) that the outstanding debt would be 
rising as fast as GNP when the budget deficit expressed as a 
proportion of GNP, equals: 
D e b tt-1 ( _ Y , (4, 
GNPt_x 1+y 
Debt,. , (ci 
ili (y) ( 5 ) GNPt 
In principle, the debt/GNP ratio would rise if bfc exceeds 
D e b tt-1 ly) and fall if it is smaller than D e b tt-1 ly) 
GNPf GNP^ 
Likewise the outstanding debt as a proportion of GNP would remain 
constant if the deficit/GNP ratio equals Debtt-1 ^ 
GNPt 
The framework provided by equation (2) can now be used to examine 
the movements in the debt/GNP ratio in South Africa over the 
period 1960-1987. However, a qualification has to be noted 
first, because Table 4 revealed that Exchequer deficits were only 
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one of several factors which contributed to the growth of the 
outstanding debt over the period 1960-1987. Other factors 
include, exchange rate adjustments, transfers to and from the 
Stabilisation Account,etc. To incorporate these factors into the 
analysis, the "deDt increasing" term (bfc) in equation (2) can be 
decomposed. Equation (2) then becomes: 
Debtt _ Debt,.,! = Debtfc-1 (_-y} + ^ + b2fc + b3fc + b4fc + b5fc ( g ) 
GWPt GNPt_ j GMPfl 1+Y 
where b1^ = Exchequer deficits, 
= Foreign exchange adjustments, 
= Net transfers to the Stabilisation Account, 
= IMF loan transactions, 
= Other factors (i.e., changes in cash balances 
and the cancellation of debt, 
all expressed as ratios of GNPt. 
It follows from equation (b) that the condition for stability of 
the debt/GNP ratio would then be as follows: 
_ b1,. = D e b tt-1 t + b 2 t + b \ + b 4 t + b 5 t (7) 
GNPt_x 1+y 
b 4 
The existence of "non-budgetary" influences on the outstanding 
debt thus affects the size of the budget deficits required to 
stabilise the debt/GNP ratio at any given level. 
6.4 Analysing Changes in the Debt/GNP Ratio : 1980s 
Equation v.6 J and the data contained in Table 4 have been used to 
quantify the contribution made by the various "causes of debt 
changes" to the year-to-year changes in the debt ratio between 
1981 and 1987. The results of these calculations are given in 
Table 10. 
The following salient results emerge from this table: 
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The growth of nominal GNP has been a significant negative factor 
and, all other things remaining the same, would have accounted 
for a fall in the debt ratio of over 42 percentage points. The 
latter was only partly off-set by regular Exchequer deficits and 
other factors. 
As a result, the debt ratio fell by 7,14 per cent over the period 
as a whole. However, this fall was totally accounted for by a 
fall in the debt ratio of 9,4 percentage points between 1979 and 
1981. Between 1981 and 1987 the ratio actually increased by 2,27 
percentage points. The role of the "non-budgetary" factors in 
this latter increase is revealing. 
In the first place, the several "non-budgetary" factors 
frequently served as a stabilising factor by off-setting 
differences between the rise in GNP and increases in the total 
debt resulting from Exchequer deficits. This effect was 
particularly visible in 1980/81 and again in 1982/83, when net 
transfers to the Stabilisation Account and new IMF loans exerted 
upward pressure on the debt ratio. The reverse, however, 
occurred in 1983/84 when the deficit ratio suddenly jumped to 
5,37 per cent. In 1984/85 and 1985/86, falls in the the external 
value of the Rand again helped to keep the debt ratio on a 
relatively even keel. 
The "non-budgetary" factors nonetheless combined to exert a 
positive net effect on the growth rate of the total debt. As 
indicated in Table 11, after March 1981, budget deficits alone 
would have kept the debt/GNP ratio between 31 per cent and 33 per 
cent, with an effective increase in the ratio of only 1,29 per 
cent between 1981 and 1987. In terms of basics, whilst the total 
debt actually increased by R29 469 million in the 1980s, only 
R25 587 million or 87 per cent of the latter was accounted for by 
annual budget deficits. Instead, the various "other factors" 
accounted for a net increases in the outstanding debt of R3 890 
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million over this period. In the absence of the debt created by 
these "other factors", the debt/GNP ratio in 1987 would have 
amounted to only 32,84 per cent, rather than the 35,76 per cent 
shown in Table 9. 
Table 11 Evolution of a Hypothetical Debt/GNP Ratio, Based On 
Actual Exchequer Deficits Alone (Percentages) 
As at 31 March Debt/GNP ratio*1) 
1980 39, 79 
1981 31, 55 
1982 31, 28 
1983 30, 70 
1984 32, 82 
1985 32, 13 
1986 32,41 
1987 32, 84 
Source: Table 4. 
Note: (1) Calculated by dividing total debt at end March by 
GNP of last completed calender year. 
The relative stability of the debt/GNP ratio in the 1980s is 
sometimes interpreted as a sign of fiscal over-conservatism which 
might have contributed to the recession in South Africa. Indeed, 
the foregoing analysis of the role of other factors indicated 
that budgetary policy, expressed in terms of Exchequer deficits, 
was actually even more restrained during the period in question 
than what can be deduced indirectly from the relative stability 
of the total debt ratio. On the other hand, if the budgetary 
stance of the 19b0s is evaluated against the background of the 
inflationary conditions that prevailed during the period in 
question, and against the fact that the debt t.itio had been 
falling until 1981, a different picture emerges. This point can 
be explained as follows: 
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Equation 13 i showed clearly that the budget deficit "required" to 
stabilise the debt ratio is affected by the rate of growth of 
nominal GNP as well as the initial debt ratio, i.e., given the 
latter, the higher the rate of growth of nominal GNP the greater 
would be the "required" deficit ratio to stabilise the debt ratio 
at its current level. It follows that the high (rising) nominal 
growth rates of the current inflationary period in South Africa 
necessitated high (rising) budget deficit ratios to stabilise 
the debt ratio. In the longer-term context, between 1972 and 
1987, the high inflation rates would have permitted the 
authorities to run much higher structural deficits (i.e., 
deficits as a ratio of GNP) than before, without increasing the 
debt ratio. The fact that the latter ratio in fact declined 
rather than increased or remained constant over the longer-term 
between 1972 and 1982 must indeed be interpreted as a sign of 
fiscal responsibility, relatively speaking at least. 
It is important that the behaviour of the debt ratio and its 
relation to budgetary policy in the 1980s be viewed against the 
background just sketched. Contrary to the earlier trend, 
budgetary deficits were now such that they made the total debt 
rise faster than nominal GNP, thus actually raising the debt 
ratio moderately over the period 1981-1987, clearly reversing the 
earlier trend of a falling ratio. The relatively small gain in 
the debt/GNP ratio between 1983 to 1987 however raises the issue 
of whether budgetary policy should not perhaps have been made 
more expansionary, given the exceptionally depressed conditions 
of the economy at the time. The analysis in Section 6.6 of 
changes in the composition of budget deficits will throw further 
light on the relative restrictiveness of budgetary policy in the 
1980s. 
The essential conclusion emerging from the analysis in the last 
few paragraphs is that fiscal policy cannot be judged solely on 
the basis of movements in the debt/GNP ratio. For example, in 
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terms of equation (3) the deficit ratio "required" to stabilise 
the debt ratio at its current level of 35,76 per cent is 
relatively low because the latter ratio is historically at a very 
low level. However, had the current debt ratio been, say 50 per 
cent, current inflation rate of approximately 15 per cent per 
annum ana a real growth rate of 2,5 per cent would have permitted 
the government to run total deficits of approximately 7,50 per 
cent of GNP, without raising the debt ratio. As the deficit 
ratio consistent with stabilising the debt/GNP ratio would in 
addition rise further if inflation accelerates, the reliability 
of movements in the debt ratio as an indicator of fiscal 
discipline and responsibility is clearly doubtful. The analysis 
in the next section will throw further light on the role of 
inflation per se as a cause of movements in the debt/GNP ratio. 
6.5 The Role of Inflation 
In an inflationary situation such as that experienced in South 
Africa in recent years, it is useful to draw an analytical 
distinction between the nominal and real growth of GNP when 
analysing changes in the debt/GNP ratio. Whilst both inflation 
and positive real growth would tend to reduce the debt/GNP ratio, 
an erosion of the real value of debt by inflation frequently 
leads to accusations of cheating being levelled against a 
government which is "inflating its way out of trouble". This is 
particularly likely when, as reflected by Table 12, high 
inflation rates in South Africa were accompanied since the early 
1970s by negative real interest rates resulting in bondholders 
experiencing real capital losses. The main purpose of this 
section is to throw some light on the role played by inflation in 
the movement of the debt/GNP ratio between 1972 and 1987. 
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Table 12 Inflation Rates, Average Nominal Interest Rates on tl 
State Debt, and Average Real Interest Rates on the State Debt' 
1960-1987 
Year 
Inflation 
Rates(1 ) 
Interest Rates 
Nominal(2i Real13 ) 
19b0 1,10 3, 98 2,88 
1961 1, 82 4,27 2,45 1962 1,79 4,17 2, 38 
1963 1,05 4, 27 3, 22 
1964 2,43 4,36 1, 93 1965 3, 73 4,47 0,74 1966 3, 59 4,48 0,89 1967 3, 47 5,31 1,84 196b 1, 52 5, 76 4, 24 1969 3, 00 5, 72 2,72 1970 5, 25 5, 62 0, 37 1971 6, 09 6, 17 0, 08 1972 6, 53 6, 35 -0, 18 
1973 9, 56 6, 55 -3, 01 1974 11, 63 6, 34 -5,29 1975 13,43 6,63 -6,80 
1976 11, 13 7, 21 -3, 92 1977 11, 29 7,45 -3,84 1978 10, 86 8,07 -2, 79 1979 13, 27 8, 08 -5, 19 1980 13, 76 7,87 -5, 89 
1981 15, 20 9,83 -5, 37 1982 14,67 11, 22 -3,45 1983 12, 34 12, 99 0, 65 1984 11, 66 14, 97 3, 31 1985 16, 23 13,86 -2, 37 1986 18, 60 14, 55 -4,05 
Notes: (1) Based on the consumer price index. 
(2) Average nominal interest rate on the outstanding 
State Debt. The nominal rates apply to the year ending 
on 31 March of the following year. 
(3) Nominal interest rates minus inflation. 
Source: Central Statistical Service. 
South African Reserve Bank. 
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where 
it = interest paid as a proportion of GNP 
b*t = the primary (non-interest) budget balance ratio 
Equation (10 J has been used to generate the data contained in 
Table 13. Inflation (i.e., the GNP deflator) clearly emerges as 
the major cause of the decline in the debt/GNP ratio since 1972. 
The erosion of the real value of the debt is reflected by the 
fact that inflation would, other things being equal, have reduced 
the gross debt/GNP ratio in South Africa by as much as 72 
percentage points. The "inflation tax" li.e., the inflation 
adjustment less interest) inflicted on the government's lenders 
alone equalled almost 23 per cent of GNP over the period as a 
whole. The decline in the real value of the outstanding debt 
actually exceeded interest payments in 12 out of 16 years, and it 
is only in the late 1980s that the situation was reversed to some 
extent. One would expect this unhappy experience over the 1970s 
and early 1980s to have increased the reluctance of investors to 
take up government stock in South Africa, and therefore to have 
increased the constraint on budgetary policy associated with any 
given level of outstanding debt, as reflected by the rising 
marginal and average interest rates on government debt in the 
1980s. 
6.6 Assessing the Stability of the Historical Debt Situations 
The rise and fall of the gross debt/GNP ratio in South Africa 
over the last 27 years can also be analysed in terms of the 
underlying stability conditions set out in Section 4. Table 14 
shows the historical evolution of these conditions between 1960 
and 1987. 
Several important points emerge quite clearly from the table. 
Firstly, the average interest rate (r) on the total debt was on a 
rising trend throughout the entire period, with an acceleration 
of the rise in the 1980s. Secondly, the growth of nominal GNP 
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Table 14 Underlying Debt Stability Conditions : 1960-1987 
Nominal Growth-
year ending Nominal GNP interest interest Primary 
31 March growth(1) rate(2) differential deficit(3) 
Total % of 
Percentages RM GNP 
1961 6, 59 3, 98 2, 61 -28 -0, 55 
1962 5,08 4, 27 0, 81 13 0, 24 
1963 7, 56 4, 17 3, 39 23 0, 40 
1964 11,81 4, 27 7, 54 -6 -0, 10 
1965 9, 89 4, 36 5, 53 140 1, 99 
1966 9, 16 4,47 4, 69 133 1, 73 
1967 8, 87 4, 48 4, 01 176 2, 11 
1968 12, 10 5, 31 6, 79 131 1, 40 
1969 7, 78 5, 76 2, 02 145 1,44 
1970 12, 29 5, 72 6, 57 113 1, 00 
1971 9,37 5, 62 3, 75 131 1, 06 
1972 10, 79 6, 17 4, 62 466 3, 39 
1973 12, 98 6, 35 6, 63 251 1, 62 
1974 23, 78 6, 55 17, 23 -56 -0, 29 
1975 22, 54 6, 34 16, 20 314 1, 33 
1976 11, 08 6, 63 4, 45 778 2, 98 
1977 14, 42 7, 21 7, 21 1 234 4, 15 
1978 11, 57 7,45 4, 12 1 109 3, 32 
1979 13, 80 8, 07 5, 73 970 2, 55 
1980 20,07 8, 08 11, 99 459 1, 01 
1981 29, 93 7, 87 22, 06 -877 -1, 48 
1982 13, 51 9,83 3, 68 394 0, 59 
1983 13, 37 11, 22 2, 15 -102 -0, 13 
1984 11, 89 12, 99 -1, 10 1 148 1, 35 
1985 17, 98 14, 97 3, 01 -216 -0, 21 
1986 12, 86 13, 86 -1,0 -574 -0, 51 
1987 17, 14 14, 55 2, 59 924 0, 69 
Hotes: (1) Based on growth in latest completed calender year. 
(2) Includes discount on the issue of government stock. 
Calculated by dividing interest payments plus discounts in 
fiscal year by outstanding debt at beginning of the year. 
(3) Primary deficits +, surpluses -. The primary deficit 
equals the overall deficit before borrowing minus gross 
interest payments. 
Sources: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, (various 
issues). 
Republic of South Africa, Part I of the Reports of the 
Auditor-General (Government Printer: Pretoria), 1961-1986. 
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[y) exceeded the average nominal interest rate on the outstanding 
debt throughout the period, except in 1983/84 and again in 
1985/86. The underlying longer-term debt situation had therefore 
remained basically "non-explosive", even though the crucial 
growth-interest differential (y-r, narrowed considerably in the 
1980s. Lastly there were regular primary deficits (i.e., the 
overall deficit before borrowing less gross interest payments) 
until 1980, with surpluses only in isolated instances; however, 
these deficits had been curtailed drastically since the beginning 
of the 1980s, with relatively small surpluses recorded in four 
out of the seven completed fiscal years. In the 1980s as a 
whole, the average primary deficit equalled only R100 million per 
annum, or 0,1 per cent of GNP. 
Table 15 gives data to illustrate the longer-term context in 
which year-to-year movements in the underlying factors should be 
evaluated. Three distinct periods are considered: (1) the pre-
1972 period, when inflation was still relatively low; (2) the 
1970s, representing the period when inflation began to be a major 
problem; and (3, the 1980s, a period of continuing rapid 
inflation combined with low average real growth rates of the 
economy. 
The 1960-1972 Situation 
The average nominal interest rate on the State Debt showed a 
rising trend during 1960-87 and this rising trend was also 
evident during the 1960s. However, the average rate of interest 
on the debt during the period 1960-72 as a whole was trailing the 
growth of nominal GNP, producing an average positive growth-
interest differential during this period of 4,36 per cent. The 
average primary deficit for the period was R120 million or 1,4 
per cent of GNP. 
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Table 15 Historical Debt Situations in South Africa^1 
(Percentages) 
Debt Situations 
Years ending 31 March 1961-72 1973-80 1981-87 
Primary deficit/GNP ratio 1,40 2, 19 0, 11 
Nominal GNP growth 9, 27 16, 28 16, 67 
Nominal gross 
interest rate 4, 91 7, 08 12, 14 
Long-term equilibrium 
debt/GNP ratio 35, 08 27, 68 2, 58 
Actual debt/GNP ratio at 
beginning of period 51, 84 44, 86 39, 79 
Actual debt/GNP ratio at 
end of period 44, 86 39, 79 35, 76 
Number of years debt 
ratio reaches 50% oo oo oo 
Long-term equilibrium 
deficit/GNP ratio 2, 98 3, 93 0, 38 
Sources: Table 14 
Notes: (1; Projections assume a one-to-one relationship 
between budget deficits and the increase in total debt. 
Based on this underlying data, the long-term steady state debt 
ratio would be equal to 35,08 per cent. Starting with an initial 
debt/GNP ratio of 51,84 per cent in 1961, the fiscal calculus 
would predict a fall in the ratio towards the steady state level; 
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in the event, the ratio in question actually fell to 44,86 
cent by 1972. 
The 1973-80 Situation 
The nominal interest rate on the State debt was rising between 
1973 and 1980, and the average for the period as a whole was 
therefore higher than for the previous period. However, the 
1970s W6T6 dlso characterised by a risincj inflation rate, to 
which the average nominal interest rate on the State Debt was not 
fully adjusted. The result was a relatively high average 
positive growth-interest differential of 9,20 per cent. However, 
the favourable effect of this improvement (from the State's point 
of view) in the growth-interest differential was off-set partly 
by a rise in the average primary deficit as a ratio of GNP, i.e., 
the primary deficit was held at an average of R632 million or 
2,19 per cent of GNP between 1973 and 1980. The net effect of 
the movements in these opposing forces was that the long-term 
debt ratio was moved down to 27,68 per cent from the higher level 
based on the experience of the 1960s. 
The 1980s Situation 
The period from 1980/81 to 1986/87 3aw further relatively 
dramatic changes in the fundamentals of the debt situation. The 
average nominal interest rate on the State Debt continued its 
upward trend, rising from 7,87 per cent in 1980/81 to 14,55 per 
cent in 1986/87, giving an average for the period 1980/81-1986/87 
of 12,14 per cent. Moreover, after a dramatic but very 
exceptional increase of 29,93 per cent in nominal GNP in 1980, 
which followed in the wake of the gold price rise, the nominal 
GNP rose at an average annual rate of 14,46 per cent during the 
remainder of the period, giving an average for the period as a 
whole of 16,67 per cent. The net result is that the growth-
interest differential equalled 4,53 per cent for the period as a 
whole (but only 1,56 per cent for the period 1981/82-1986/87). 
68 
This worsening growth-interest differential was however off-set 
by a reversal of earlier trends as far as the primary deficit is 
c o n c e r n e d , because, as we have seen, primary deficits in the 
1980s averaged only R100 million or 0,1 per cent of GNP. 
Consequently, the longer-term equilibrium debt ratio, based on 
the average data set out above, collapsed to 2,58 per cent. 
Given this latter figure, the long-term equilibrium ratio of the 
budget deficit to GNP would equal only 0,38 per cent. 
Looking at the 1980s as a whole, therefore, the underlying fiscal 
situation continued to be "non-explosive", with the fundamentals 
of the situation, as represented by the averages of the basics 
for the 1980s, indicating a lower rather than a higher longer-
term debt ratio for the future. 
At the same time, however, the situation had become more 
delicately balanced because of the narrowing of the "average" 
growth-interest differential in the 1980s. The stability of the 
underlying debt situation also fluctuated considerably. For 
example, potentially "explosive" situations existed when the 
growth-interest differential became negative on two occasions 
(i.e., in 1983/84 and 1985/86). The converse existed in 1980/81, 
1982/83 and 1984/85 when the situation was "stable" but 
potentially tending to a finite accumulation of net assets, on 
account of positive growth-interest differentials combined with 
primary budget surpluses. 
It is worth emphasizing the way in which the more restrictive 
fiscal stance, as measured in terms of primary budget deficits, 
contributed to the relative stability of the debt ratio in the 
1980s. To have continued running primary deficits of the general 
order of magnitude as those that prevailed in tha 1970s, in the 
face of the rising interest costs, would have required the 
running of historically unprecedented total budget deficits of 
between 6-7 per cent of GNP, and would have put the debt ratio on 
a definite steeply rising trend. In the event, total budget 
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deficits were allowed to rise moderately under the weight of 
interest costs, to an average for the 1980s of 4,02 per cent of 
GNP. 
However, the potentially very destabilising effect of the 
escalating interest costs and the worsening growth-interest 
differential on the underlying longer-term debt situation was 
effectively off-set by the dramatic turnabout in the primary 
deficit situation. This turnabout was partially obscured by the 
relatively large swings which occurred in the government's 
primary deficits in the 1980s (i.e., deficits in 3 years and 
surpluses in 4). Since it is, however, the trend rather than 
year-to-year changes in budget deficits and debt accumulation 
that serve as an indicator of fiscal discipline and 
responsibility, the budgets of the 1980s as a whole therefore 
represented a radical reversal of earlier budgetary tends as well 
as a substantial squeeze on non-interest components of the 
budget. 
In a medium-term context, recent non-interest budgetary behaviour 
thus caused the rise in the actual debt/GNP ratio to be narrowly 
circumscribed, despite the escalation of interest costs, and 
despite the operation of some "non-budgetary" factors that made 
for a rise in the outstanding debt. 
This once again raises the vexing issue of whether a too 
restrictive fiscal policy measured in terms of primary deficits 
did not contribute to the prolonged depressed economic conditions 
in the 1980s. In particular, would the alternative of raising 
the debt ratio by lowering tax rates not have been more 
appropriate as a means of both sustaining demand and raising 
productivity, as part of a policy of growth without inflation? 
To conclude, this section's projections, admittedly based on 
purely arithmetical calculations and the arbitrary "average" set 
of conditions that prevailed in the 1980s, suggest a gradual 
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longer-term lowering of the debt/GNP ratio, despite some recent 
reversals from this trend. However, this relatively favourable 
outlook for the future debt situation is subject to important 
qualifications as the averages for the 1980s mask some disturbing 
trends which might not be reversible in the medium-term. 
Specifically, the projections depend on the extent to which the 
government would be able to sustain policy trends and conditions 
of the 1980s as a whole. Since the recent high and rising 
interest on the outstanding debt is unlikely to be brought down 
speedily for reasons peculiar to the public debt, and since 
budget deficits show clear signs of rising to levels that are 
noticeably higher than those of the early 1980s and will not 
easily be reversed, the illustrative projections of this section 
may be too optimistic. Section 8 therefore considers alternative 
fiscal scenarios. 
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7. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S NET DEBT SITUATION: 1960-1987 
A study of the historical evolution of the Central Government's 
gross debt situation is only part of the total debt picture, 
because the government has historically played an important role 
as a financial intermediary, and has therefore also accumulated a 
substantial volume of financial assets as an off-set against its 
liabilities. This section is designed to elucidate this aspect 
of the historical evolution of the government's current debt 
situation. 
7.1 The Government's Role as a Lender 
Table 16 highlights the historical importance of government 
lending in the South African budget as well as its declining role 
over the last decade. 
The table shows that net government lending comprised important 
proportions of total outlays, as measured by Exchequer issues, 
during most of the period covered in the table. Net lending 
likewise equalled high proportions of Exchequer deficits during 
most of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. 
Government lending thus clearly emerges as a major cause of 
budget deficits during these years. In several instances net 
lending actually exceeded Exchequer deficits. In these years the 
government therefore had net financial surpluses, i.e., it was a 
net lender and its net financial liabilities therefore decreased. 
However, there has been a substantial decline in the government's 
lending operations over the last decade. 
Whilst net lending as a ratio of total Exchequer issues equalled 
an average of 14,9 per cent during the late 1960s and 1970s, this 
percentage decreased steadily between 1980 and 1985 to 1,8 per 
cent in 1985 . (Net lending to the departmental enterprises, 
including the National Housing Fund and the Community Development 
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Table 16 Central Government Lending: 1968-1985 (R. Millions and Percentages) 
Year 
ending 
31 March 
New loans ^  ^ Repayments Other 
Deparmental 
enterprises 
(net) 
Net lending^2^ 
Net financial 
b a l a n c e 1 
Total 
RM 
Percentages of 
Exchequer 
issues 
Exchequer 
deficit 
Total 
RM % GNP 
1968 X X X 267 1 j, 4 80, 7 -64 -0,7 
69 X X X 577 27,9 148,7 +189 1,9 
70 X X X 527 20, 8 134,4 +135 1,2 
71 X X X 368 13,4 86,8 -56 -0,5 
72 X X X 588 16, 7 73,3 -214 -1,6 
73 528 49 60 550 14,4 86,5 -86 -0,6 
74 612 ll5 67 675 14,8 163,8 +263 -1,4 
75 709 56 74 788 13,8 97, 5 -20 -0,1 
76 984 61 97 1 110 15,9 82,8 -230 -0,9 
77 1 027 58 119 1 214 14,9 61, 7 -753 -2,5 
7b 1 095 39 160 1 148 12,7 57,4 -H52 -2,6 
79 1 287 44 173 1 416 13,8 66,8 -704 -1,9 
80 1 274 88 194 1 380 11,8 77,7 -396 -0, 9 
81 1 117 7 ^  218 1 265 9,1 229,6 +714 +1,2 
82 920 28 269 1 161 6,9 49, 5 -i 184 -1,8 
83 354 25 594 922 4,7 38,85 -1 451 -1,9 
84 172 27 329 474 2,0 10, 3 -4 113 -4, b 
95 
i 
310 282 475 503 1,8 11,6 -3 848 -3,8 
Notes: (1) Includes SATS and Posts and Telecommunications, but excludes other departmental 
business enterprises. 
'2) Includes loans and the acquisition of shares. 
(3) Deficit before net borrowing: Deficit Surplus +. 
Sources:(1) South African Reserve Bank. 
(2) South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, (various issues;. 
(3 J J G van der Walt: Die Rol van die Sentrale Regering as Finansifile Tussenganger, 
Unpublished M.Com Dissertation. University of Pretoria, Pretoria, October, 1980, Table 
14. 
x Not available. 
Fund, but excluding the SATS and Post Office, nonetheless 
increased from R194 million in 1979/80 to R475 million in 
1984/85). This apparent partial phasing out of the Central 
Government's role as a financial intermediary represents an 
important structural change which has had an important effect on 
the evolution of the government's overall debt situation over the 
last decade. 
7.2 The Net Debt Situation: 1968-87 
Table 17 shows the effects of the government's combined borrowing 
and lending activities on the evolution of its debt over the 
period 1968 to 1987. The following picture emerges. 
The government's net debt situation was relatively speaking very 
favourable during the 1960s and early 1970s, with the net debt as 
a ratio of GNP equalling only 4,02 per cent between 1960-1977, 
and only 6,3 per cent on 31 March 1977. On this latter date 
financial assets of the State equalled 84,5 per cent of its 
liabilities. 
However, after fiscal year 1976/77, the total nominal net debt 
rose quickly to reach R5 265 million or 11,5 per cent of GNP at 
the end of March 1980. The rate of increase in the net debt 
gathered further momentum during the 1980s, so that at the end of 
March 1987 the total net debt equalled R34 342 million or 25,8 
per cent of GNP. This represented a six-fold increase between 
1980 and 1987, or an average annual increase of 31,50 per cent, 
compared to a 2,5 fold increase in the gross debt over the same 
period. Moreover, at the end of March 1987 the State's financial 
assets comprised only 27,87 per cent of its financial assets. 
A part of the explanation for the rate of increase in the total 
net debt outstripping that of the gross debt in the 1980s is 
obviously1 that the diminished role of the State as a financial 
intermediary has had the effect of slowing down the growth of the 
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Table 17 Evolution of the Central Government's Net Debt: 
1968-1975 (R. Millions and Percentages) 
As at 
31 March 
Gross rinanc 
liabilities 
:ial 1) Financial assets ' 
Net financial 
liabilities 
% GNP 
1968 4 218 3 807 411 4,4 
69 4 879 4 403 476 4,7 
70 5 212 4 931 281 2,5 
71 5 451 5 298 153 1, 23 
72 6 165 5 885 280 2,0 
73 7 135 6 435 700 4,5 
74 7 761 7 110 651 3,4 
75 8 472 7 899 573 2,4 
76 10 264 9 009 1 255 4,8 
77 12 095 10 223 1 872 6,3 
78 14 251 10 089 4 162 12, 5 
79 16 295 11 505 4 790 12, 6 
80 18 150 12 885 5 265 11,5 
81 19 853 11 426 8 427 14, 2 
82 22 065 12 587 9 478 14,1 
83 26 467 13 509 12 958 17, 0 
84 30 498 13 440 17 058 20, 0 
85- 36 445 13 943 22 502 22,4 
86 41 084 14 443 26 641 23,4 
87 47 613 13 271 34 342 25, 8 
Notes: (1) Total State Debt. 
(2) Excluding cash balances in the Exchequer Account and 
PMG Accounts. 
Sources: (1; South African Reserve Bank. 
(2) South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly 
(various issues). 
(3i J G van der Walt: Die Rol van die 
Regering as Finansifile Tussenganger, 
M.Com 
Pretoria, 
Dissertation, University of 
Bulletin, 
Sentrale 
Unpublished 
Pretoria, 
October 1980, Table 16. 
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government's financial assets, without a corresponding reduction 
in the growth of the State Debt, because government policy 
allowed the gap left in the budget by the declining volume of 
lending to be taken up by other expenditures and/or reductions in 
taxation. In other words, budget deficits, defined to include 
net government lending, were sustained at previous levels or even 
increased at a time when the lending component of total 
government outlays was being drastically curtailed. Table 16 
reflects this structural change in the budget by revealing that 
net financial deficits as a percentage of GNP were on a rising 
trend between 1977 and 1985. Thus, while the financial deficit as 
a ratio of GNP equalled only 0,24 per cent in the decade 
preceeding 1977, it equalled 3,08 per cent of GNP between 1982 
and 1985. As the former recipients of government loans (i.e., 
SATS, Post and Telecommunications, etc.) continued to draw their 
own capital requirements from the same pool of loanable funds as 
the government itself, but now only directly instead of 
indirectly via the Treasury, the structural change in the 
composition of the government's outlays represented an effective 
expansion of the total outlays of the central government. It 
also increased the net debt considerably as a result of the 
widening gap between the State's financial liabilities and its 
financial assets. 
A second reason for the rapid growth of the net debt since the 
mid-1970s was the conversion of outstanding loans to SATS and the 
Provincial Administrations into permanent capital (see Table 18). 
As loans amounting to over R6 000 million were effectively 
written off the government's asset register, it had the effect of 
further widening the gap between the States's financial 
liabilities and its financial assets, by the stroke of a pen. 
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Table 18 Central Government Loans Converted into Permanent 
Capital (R millions) 
Year ending Provincial 
31 March Administrations SATS Total 
1977/78 1 283 - 1 283 
1980/81 - 2 724 2 724 
1983/84 - 543 543 
1986/87 — 1 672 1 672 
Total 1 283 4 939 6 222 
Source: South African Reserve Bank. 
7.3 Net Debt Service Costs 
The shift that occurred in the composition of government outlays 
over the last decade, and the writing down of the State's 
financial assets, probably had little direct effect on the 
efficacy of the budget per se as an instrument of macro-economic 
policy, mainly because government loans were replaced by other 
outlays, and the writing down of the State's assets involved no 
cash flows. However, the erosion of the State's assets and the 
concomitant deterioration in the government's net debt situation 
contributed to a rapid accumulation of net debt service costs. 
The position was aggravated by a decline in the yield on the 
government's financial assets in the 1980s. Consequently, the 
increase in net debt service costs in the 1980s was even more 
pronounced than the increase in the gross costs. 
As shown in Table 19, net debt service costs, as a percentage of 
GNP, rose from 1,4 per cent in 1980/81 to 4,3 per cent in 
1986/87. As a result, debt service costs absorbed a rapidly 
rising share of available government funds, with net costs, as a 
percentage of Exchequer receipts, having risen from 4,59 per cent 
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Table 19 The Central Government's Debt Service Costs: 1973-1987 
(R. Millions) 
Year 
ending 
31 March 
Interest 
Payments 
Interest 
Receipts(1) Total 
Net Debt Service Costs 
Percentages 
Change(2) GNP Exchequer 
Receipts 
! 1973 
| 
390 273 117 0, 8 3,7 
j 1974 468 285 183 56,4 1,0 4,4 
1975 494 328 166 -9,3 0,7 3,4 
1976 562 389 173 4,2 0,7 3,1 
1977 733 468 265 53, 2 0,9 4,3 
1978 890 530 360 35,9 1,1 5,1 
1979 1 150 651 500 38, 9 1,3 6,1 
1980 1 317 663 654 30,8 1,4 6,6 
1981 1 428 574 854 30,6 1,4 6,4 
1982 1 951 527 1 424 66,7 2,1 9,8 
1983 2 475 583 1 891 32,8 2, 5 11, 0 
1984 3 439 512 2 927 54,8 3,4 15, 2 
1985 4 567 529 4 038 38,0 4,0 17,1 
1986 5 052 370 4 682 16, 0 4,1 15,7 
1987 5 979 302 5 677 21, 3 4,3 16,4 
Notes: (1) Including interest and dividend receipts. 
(2) Increases +, decrease -
Sources: South African Reserve Bank. 
Republic of South Africa, Part 1 of the Reports of 
the Auditor General (Government Printer: Pretoria), 
1973-1986. 
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in the 1970s to 16,4 per cent in 1986/87. Two main factors 
contributed to the more rapid rise in the net than the gross debt 
service burden of the government. 
In the first place, whilst interest and dividend receipts 
constituted important proportions of gross interest payments 
since 1973, the government's interest/dividend receipts actually 
declined in absolute as well as relative terms in the 1980s, 
partly because of the aforementioned decline in the government's 
lending operations, and partly because of the aforementioned 
conversion of outstanding loans to SATS and the Provincial 
Administrations into permanent capital. As there was no 
corresponding reduction of State Debt on which interest continued 
to be paid, these conversions, amounting to an implicit subsidy 
equal to the interest foregone, contributed to the rapid 
acceleration of net budgetary cost of the State Debt during the 
period in question. I ) Table 19 shows that annual increase in 
net costs actually varied between 16 and 67 per cent in the 
1980s. 
The growing share of debt service costs in the budget is also a 
reflection of a widening gap between interest paid on the 
outstanding debt and the average yield on the government's 
financial assets, over the last eight years. After having shown 
a steady rise to 6,4 per cent in 1978/79, the average yield on 
the State's total financial assets fell to a low of 2,3 per cent 
in 1986/87, as is shown in Table 20. Since the latter rate is 
considerably lower that what the State is on average paying on 
its own debt (see Table 14; the implicit subsidy to other 
sectors of the economy is obviously an important but largely 
obscured factor in the total budgetary situation. 
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Table 20 Average Yield on the Central Government's Financial 
Assets: 1973-1987 
Year ending 
31 March 
fc 
Yield(l) 
1973 4,6 
1974 4,4 
1975 4,6 
1976 4,9 
1977 5,2 
1978 5,2 
| 1979 6,4 
1980 5,8 
1981 4,5 
1982 4,6 
1983 4,6 
1984 3,8 
1985 3,9 
1986 2,7 
1987 2, 3 
Source: Table 17 and Table 19. 
Notes: (1) calculated by dividing the State's interest and 
dividend receipts (Table 19) by its total financial 
assets (Table 17). 
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8. PROSPECTIVE FISCAL SCENARIOS : 1988-1997 
8.1 Introduction 
The chief objective of this section is to use the analytics of 
Section 4 to examine the longer-term debt and budgetary 
implications of the current and some alternative fiscal 
scenarios, concentrating on the central government's gross debt 
situation. 
Eleven different scenarios will be considered, and these will be 
divided into three groups: (1) Scenarios 1-3; (2) Scenarios A-E, 
and (3) Scenarios Pl-3. The purpose of the first group of 
scenarios is to illustrate the medium-term implications for the 
State Debt of three approximations of recent fiscal situations. 
These projections will thus be based on current conditions which 
are assumed to remain constant over the forecast period. By 
comparison, Scenarios A to E will be made slightly more realistic 
in the sense that the underlying conditions will be allowed to 
change depending on assumptions about inflation, the growth rate 
and interest rates over the next ten years. Scenarios Pl-3 
examine a policy of maintaining a constant overall deficit ratio, 
under different assumptions about inflation rates, etc. 
All conclusions regarding the absolute levels of debt and debt 
burdens, as opposed to changes therein, are of course subject to 
the caveat that the central government's net debt situation is 
more favourable than its gross debt situation as discussed in 
Section 7. 
The projections of future debt and budgetary ratios have been 
derived using the purely mechanical fiscal analytics described in 
Section 4. The calculations are thus based on some simplifying 
assumptions, and these are given below. 
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8.2 Some Technical Assumptions 
It is assumed that there are no stock adjustments of the kind 
discussed in Section 5.3, i.e., that changes in the gross debt 
are equal to current budget balances. 
In addition the projections apply to the gross debt. 
Consequently, the assumed prospective budget deficits are 
inclusive of net government lending, implying that changes in the 
latter would be off-set by policy changes in other areas of the 
budget. Net lending currently comprises approximately 12 per 
cent of Excnequer deficits (Table 16). 
Interest rates are rates before tax, and primary budget deficits 
are thus defined as follows: Government expenditures minus 
revenues (including tax on interest) minus gross interest 
payments. 
8.3 Assessing the Current Debt Situation 
Assumptions 
Scenarios 1-3 are based on the following assumptions: 
Scenario 1 (The 1986/87 Situation) 
The primary deficit, nominal growth and interest rates 
remain as realised in 1986/87. A constant deficit ratio of 
0,69 per cent is thus combined with a constant growth-
interest differential of 2,59 per cent, given a 17,14 per 
cent growth rate of nominal GNP, and an average interest 
rate on government debt of 14,55 per cent. 
Scenario 2 (The 1987 Budget) 
The primary deficit as a ratio of GNP remains at the budget 
1987/88 level of 0,96 per cent. The economy grows at a trend 
rate of 2,5 per cent per annum in real terms. Inflation 
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continues at 15 per cent per annum. The average nominal 
interest rate on the outstanding State Debt remains at its 
19B6/B7 level of 14,55 per cent. 
Scenario 3 (Revised 1987 Budget) 
As in 12), but the primary deficit is raised to 2 per cent of 
GNP . 
Table 21 sets out the results of the calculations, for the period 
1988 to 1997. 
Conclusions 
Subject to the limitations of the underlying assumptions as well 
as the mechanical nature of the projections, the following 
salient results emerge from the calculations. 
(1) In the absence of any extra-budgetary influences on the 
outstanding debt, Scenario 1 (the 1986/87 situation) would steer 
the gross debt/GNP ratio on a declining trend, with a long-term 
equilibrium ratio of only 31,21 per cent compared to the current 
35,76 per cent. The equilibrium level would be reached in 
approximately 270 years. The declining trend of the actual debt 
ratio stems from the fact that the fall in the ratio caused by 
the rising GNP would exceed the deficit ratio, given the current 
inflation rate and average interest rate on debt. 
(2) The slightly more expansionary budget situation as 
represented by the 1987 budget estimate (i.e., overall deficit of 
R8 421 million) would reverse the downward trend of the debt 
ratio, but only moderately so, with a steady-state equilibrium 
level of 38,24 per cent. By 1997 the debt ratio would be barely 
0,5 per cent above the 1987 level. The equilibrium ratio would 
be reached in 215 years. 
(3) As could be expected, the projections of debt ratios under 
Scenarios 1-2 imply that the overall deficit ana debt cost ratios 
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would either decline slightly or rise slightly over the 1U year 
period, subject to the caveat that the interest rate on the debt 
did not rise any further. Both scenarios would therefore have 
the effect of stabilising the role of budget deficits and 
interest costs in the economy. Whether or not this would also 
stabilise the share of interest in the total current outlays of 
the government, depends on the pace at which the latter grows. 
For example, any substantial future slow-down in the rate of 
increase in total current outlays vis-a-vis GNP would have the 
effect of raising the share of debt service costs in the totals, 
and vice versa. 
(4) The raising of the primary deficit ratio to a constant 2 
per cent of GNP (i.e., an overall deficit of RIO 048 million in 
1987/88) will indeed move the long-term equilibrium debt ratio to 
a much higher level, but the situation will not be "explosive" in 
the sense that the debt ratio and debt service costs will rise 
indefinitely or at a vastly accelerated rate. It would take many 
years for the higher steady state ratio of 79,66 per cent to be 
reached, and the actual ratio will be only 41,00 per cent and 
45,62 per cent by 1991/92 and 1996/97, respectively. The actual 
debt ratio would thus increase at the rate of approximately 1 
percentage point per year, between 1988 and 1997. The long-term 
equilibrium level would be reached after approximately 337 years. 
(5) Under Scenario 3 the overall budget deficit and debt 
service burden would also not rise explosively over the medium-
term. The overall deficit would be raised initially to 6,42 per 
cent of GNP, and over the next 4 years the ratio would rise 
further by an additional 0,54 per cent of GNP. By 1996/97 the 
deficit would amount to 7,54 per cent of GNP. Debt Servicing 
costs would rise by 1,2 per cent from 4,42 per cent of GNP in 
1987/88, to 5,54 per cent in 1996/97, provided that the average 
interest rate did not rise above the 1986/87 level. 
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Some of the foregoing conclusions may now be drawn together. The 
first point is that none of the current debt situations per se 
represent an "explosive" situation. On the contrary, the growth 
of the debt and interest costs would continue to be narrowly 
circumscribed under the first two scenarios. Scenario 3 would 
however become non-viable at some time beyond 1997, because the 
steady-state equilibrium budget deficit and debt servicing costs, 
expressed as ratios of GNP, equal 13,59 per cent and 11,59 per 
cent, respectively, in this scenario. The prospect of such 
ratios would clearly make Scenario 3 unacceptable for the longer-
term. This does not mean that the government would be bankrupt 
or in a totally uncontrollable situation by adopting a goal of 
maintaining a 2 per cent primary deficit on average. It merely 
implies that the budgetary situation would have to be reversed at 
some stage by either lowering the primary deficit or lowering the 
average interest rate, given the growth rate of GNP. Under such 
a scenario the task of the government would thus be to weigh up 
the economic advantages to be derived in the medium-term from 
additional spending and/or tax reductions, financed by more 
government borrowing, against the prospect and feasibility of 
bringing about an improvement in the budgetary situation at a 
later stage, either through automatic stabilisers or, if that is 
not enough, by way of discretionary policy steps. 
An important additional policy factor to consider is that the 
projected evolution of the debt/GNP ratios through to 1997 under 
all three scenarios is based on the assumption of a continuation 
of a high rate of inflation. As we have seen, inflation has 
historically had an important effect on the evolution of the 
debt/GNP ratio, and the major part of the decline in the latter 
ratio, especially since 1972, can be attributed to the fall in 
the value; of money. Scenarios 1-3 imply that this erosion of the 
outstanding debt by inflation will continue, and the impact of it 
especially on the financial markets must be an important 
consideration in any assessment of the projections offered in 
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this section. 
8.4 Alternative Scenarios 
This section illustrates the longer-term debt and budgetary 
implications of several alternative fiscal scenarios over the 
next 10 years. Its purpose is essentially to throw some light on 
the longer-term parameters within which debt policy may be 
operated in the short-term. 
Forward projections of the debt/GNP ratios would obviously depend 
crucially on assumptions about the inflation rate, real growth 
rate of GNP, the average interest rate on the outstanding 
government debt and the non-interest budget deficit over the next 
10 years. These assumptions are set out below. 
Assumptions Underlying the Scenarios 
In the light of the government's declared policy of reducing 
inflation, Scenarios A-D below assume that the current 
disinflationary policies are successful; however, as the rate at 
which the government can bring down the inflation rate is very 
much at issue, two alternatives are investigated, i.e., rapid 
deflation and gradual deflation. Either way, a higher long-term 
real growth rate is assumed to be associated with an improved 
inflation outlook. By contrast. Scenario E assumes that the 
government's disinflationary policies are unsuccessful, with a 
relatively high inflation rate coinciding with a lower but 
positive growth rate prevailing over the medium-term. 
Also, on the assumption that the government is unlikely to be 
able to (or to want to) hold primary deficit ratios at present 
levels, and that the latter might consequently rise 
substantially, the alternative scenarios sketched below make 
possible a comparison of relatively low (1 pei cent) with 
relatively high 12 per cent) primary deficit ratios. 
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It is further worth noting that the assumption of a constant 
primary deficit ratio assumes implicitly that the effect of 
automatic stabilisers and real and inflationary bracket creep is 
off-set by policy changes. The assumption of a constant deficit 
ratio must not therefore be associated with an unchanged fiscal 
policy over the course of the business cycle. 
Lastly, the scenarios set out below are not based on detailed 
analysis of economic relationships in the South African economy; 
however, it is believed that the various scenarios represent 
reasonable possibilities. 
The detailed scenarios are as follows: 
Scenario A 
The primary deficits continue at the 1987 budget level of 1 
per cent of GNP. Inflation drops gradually from 15 per cent 
per annum in 1987/88 to 7,0 per cent per annum in 1996/97. 
Real growth rises gradually to a long-term trend rate of 4,5 
per cent per annum by 1989/90. Interest on the outstanding 
debt drops gradually to 11,12 per cent in 1996/97. 
Scenario B 
As in lAJ, but inflation drops much more rapidly, to 7 per 
cent by 1991/92. 
Scenario (C) 
As in lA), but the primary deficit is raised to 2 per cent 
of GNP. 
Scenario (D) 
As in (B), but the primary deficit is raised to 2 per cent 
of GNP. 
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Scenario (E) 
This scenario assumes that the government's current 
disinflationary policies are unsuccessful. The primary 
deficit remains at 2 per cent of GNP. The economy grows at 
2 per cent in 1987/88, and 3 per cent in 1988/89, after 
which it remains constant at its new trend rate of 3 per 
cent. The inflation rate rises to 17 per cent per annum by 
1989/90, then stabilises at that level during the remainder 
of the period. The average nominal interest rate on 
outstanding debt rises to 16,8 per cent by 1996/97. 
Conclusions 
Table 22 gives the results of the calculations for Scenarios A-E. 
The main conclusions are discussed below. 
1. The calculations suggest that the debt/GNP ratio in South 
Africa is likely to rise in the medium-term and that it will not 
be easy to avoid such an outcome. This conclusion is supported 
by the fact that all five scenarios predict a higher debt/GNP 
ratio in 1997 than in 1987. However, the projections vary 
substantially. Of the four deflationary scenarios, Scenario A 
presents the most favourable picture as far as the projected debt 
ratio is concerned, combining a primary deficit ratio of only 1 
per cent with gradual deflation to give a debt ratio of less than 
40 per cent by 1997. At the opposite extreme is Scenario D (2 
per cent primary deficit plus rapid deflation) giving a debt 
ratio of over 57 per cent by 1997. The size of the primary 
deficit is clearly a big factor, and so is the pace of deflation. 
This is illustrated by the fact that Scenarios B and C are about 
equivalent in terms of their effect on the debt ratio, as both 
these scenarios would raise the ratio to approximately 47-48 per 
cent between 1987 and 1997. By comparison with Scenario B, the 
slower fall in inflation under C is therefore enough to off-set 
the higher primary deficit. 
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A further conclusion emerging from the calculations is that of 
all the scenarios envisaging a 2 per cent primary deficit, the 
inflationary scenario (E) offers the most favourable outlook for 
the debt by 1997, as it gives a debt ratio of only 43 per cent by 
1997. At the same time, however, Scenario E also presents the 
most problematical budgetary situation over the next 10 years 
(see below). 
2. Scenario A gives the most favourable budgetary situation, 
predicting a slow decline in the overall deficit and debt service 
costs as a proportion of GNP. In Scenario B these ratios remain 
approximately constant over the forecast period, despite a 
substantial rise in the debt/GNP ratio to over 47 per cent by 
1997. It is moreover revealing to note that broadly similar 
results emerge in Scenario C (primary deficit of 2 per cent of 
GNP plus gradual disinflation) and in Scenario B, as far as the 
debt burden is concerned. As already mentioned, the debt ratio 
in this latter scenario also increases to about 48 per cent by 
1997. Thus, a higher debt ratio need not be associated with a 
higher debt service burden as a ratio of GNP by 1997. 
Conversely, the raising of the primary deficit to 2 per cent of 
GNP with rapid disinflation under Scenario D would raise the 
overall budget deficit ratio to 6,4 per cent right away, and then 
cause the ratio to rise further to 7,5 per cent by 1997. Debt 
service costs in Scenario D would also rise by approximately 1,1 
per cent of GNP over the forecast period, to 5,5 per cent by 
1997. 
The effect on the Goverment's debt service burden of the raising 
of the primary deficit ratio to 2 per cent thus obviously depends 
crucially on the pace of disinflation, given the slow rate at 
which the average interest rate on government debt (i.e., the 
other part of the growth-interest differential) can be brought 
down. 
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An interesting characteristic of Scenarios B, C and D is that 
while the deficit and debt service ratios both rise during the 
disinflationary period, these ratios begin to fall back towards 
the end of the period as the relationship between the nominal 
growth rate and interest rate improves. A further decrease in 
the ratios in question can be expected if the overall debt 
situation improves after 1997, depending on the way in which the 
growth-interest differential evolves. It follows that some part 
of the relatively high or rising deficit and debt service ratios 
during the disinflationary period under Scenarios B-D may be a 
temporary phenomenon. 
3. While the prediction of a rising debt ratio under Scenarios A 
to D may be problematical, a consolation is that changes in the 
ratio will tend to take place relatively slowly, with the 
possible exception of Scenario D, which is the only scenario 
predicting a debt ratio in excess of 50 per cent within 10 years. 
Since slow changes in the debt ratio give the government more 
scope and time to change its policies in order to avoid getting 
into a difficult situation from which it cannot easily escape, a 
situation where the debt/GNP ratio rises gradually is less risky. 
In this connection, the recorded narrowing of the growth-interest 
differential in Scenarios A to D (to be discussed below) will 
have obvious implications for the pace of change in the debt 
ratio after 1997. 
4. Despite the projected rise in the debt ratios in the medium-
term, the debt situations depicted in Table 22 remain basically 
"non-explosive", in the sense that the growth-interest 
differential remains positive in the longer-term. Only in the 
rapid deflation scenarios (B and D) does the growth-interest 
differential turn negative temporarily, as the rapidly declining 
inflation rate pushes the nominal growth rate of the economy 
below the falling interest rate. During this latter period the 
rate of growth of the debt ratio is accelerated substantially. 
In both these cases a positive growth-interest differential is 
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however restored before the end of the period, as the fall in 
interest rates catches up with the fall in the rate of GNP 
growth. 
However, in the four cases where the disinflationary policies are 
successful (Scenarios A to D), the stability of the overall debt 
situation becomes progressively much more delicately balanced as 
time passes, with a positive growth-interest differential of less 
than 0,5 per cent by 1997, the importance of which would be 
appreciated if it is recalled that a debt situation is 
"explosive" when a negative growth-interest differential is 
combined with a primary deficit, whilst the debt/GNP ratio would 
be merely tending to a finite ceiling if the growth-interest 
differential is positive. This suggests that the rate of growth 
of the debt ratio after 1997 would be correspondingly more 
sensitive to the size of primary deficits than at present. 
The progressive narrowing of the growth-interest differential 
between 1987 and 1997, would in addition have the twin effects of 
(a) increasing the speed at which the debt ratio increases, and 
(b) raising substantially the long-term equilibrium debt ratios 
associated with any given primary deficit ratio. (If the various 
1997 situations were to be maintained, the fiscal calculus would 
predict the following long-term debt ratios: Scenario A - 232 
per cent; Scenario B - 293 per cent; Scenario C - 465 per cent; 
and Scenario D - 586 per cent). The 199/ situations as such are 
thus clearly non-viable in the long-term. By comparison, the 
growth-interest differential in Scenario E remains positive 
throughout and equals over 3 per cent in 1997. Its long-long 
equilibrium debt ratio is only 75 per cent. 
5. As we have seen, the speed with which inflation is reduced is 
of cardinal importance for the projected debt situation, because 
the faster the inflation rate is brought down, the faster the 
debt ratio would rise, and vice versa, given the assumed deficit 
ratios and real growth, and the difficulties of reducing the 
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average interest rate on debt in the medium-term. 
It follows that the slower the inflation rate is brought down 
over the next 10 years, the larger would be the scope for 
increasing deficits without increasing the debt ratio to 
unacceptable levels. Conversely, a rapid decline in inflation 
over the next 4-5 years would leave the government little scope 
for permanently larger deficit ratios, if the debt ratio is to be 
kept below, say, 50 per cent by 1997 (compare Scenarios B and C), 
unless the real growth rate could be raised to higher levels. 
The sensitivity of the prospective debt situation to the pace of 
disinflation could moreover present the authorities with a policy 
dilemma, especially if the maintenance of a relatively low 
debt/GNP ratio is a high priority. This can be explained as 
follows. Assuming that the current high tax rates have a 
significant adverse effect on productive activity and 
expectations of inflation in the economy, a reduction in tax 
rates may bring about a significant improvement in the situation. 
If government outlays cannot be lowered, permanently lower tax 
rates would necessitate raising government borrowing structurally 
to a higher level. However, if the economy responds quickly and 
inflation begins to fall, the stability of such a policy could be 
threatened by a deteriorating debt situation. For example, the 
projection under Scenario D suggests that to run a deficit of, 
say, higher than 2 per cent of GNP, when inflation is falling 
rapidly, would cause a rapid acceleration of the debt ratio and 
consequently necessitate a drastic policy reversal at a later 
stage. A policy of stimulating productivity and lowering 
inflationary expectations by reducing taxes and raising overall 
budget deficits could thus be relatively short-lived if the price 
level reacts quickly, unless the debt/GNP ratio is permitted to 
rise temporarily to levels which may, whilst tolerable in the 
short-term, toe considered unacceptable from a longer-term point 
of view. 
94 
6. The projections also demonstrate the sensitivity of the so-
called deflationary scenarios to the assumed evolution of the 
average interest rate on the outstanding debt. While the four 
deflationary scenarios allow for a certain degree of 
synchronisation between the fall in nominal GNP and interest 
rates, with the fall in the average interest rate assumed to lag 
behind the fall in inflation, the projected fall in interest 
rates could turn out in practice to be too optimistic, and the 
interest rate could thus remain higher for longer. In that case, 
relatively much more "unstable" debt situations may develop 
during the disinflation period, especially in the rapid deflation 
scenarios, with the debt ratio rising relatively faster to 
exceptional levels in the short to medium-term, even in Scenario 
A. 
Table 22 suggests, however, that in the longer-term a fall of the 
interest rate to the lower levels normally associated with a 
lower inflation rate and improved growth prospects, should 
produce a more "stable" debt situation. But this will not happen 
before the actual debt ratio had risen to substantially higher 
levels. Fortunately, the current low debt/GNP ratio of 35,76 per 
cent gives the government some scope for fiscal experimentation. 
At the same time, the narrowing of the growth-interest 
differential in the 1980s, and the prospect of it becoming even 
more delicately balanced during and after the disinflation 
period, would require the authorities to become much more 
watchful of the situation than at present. For example, if the 
growth-interest differentials in Scenarios C to D do not improve 
after 1997, in the form of a further fall in interest rates as 
the outstanding debt is rolled over at lower marginal rates, 
there will be a rapid acceleration of debt ratios, requiring 
drastic policy changes to contain the situation. This prospect 
should serve as an inducement to the authorities to take timeous 
action to adjust the budget. 
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7. The inflationary Scenario (E) paints a paradoxical picture 
which illustrates the contradictory role played by inflation, for 
while this scenario forecasts the most favourable outcome apart 
from Scenario A for the debt ratio, it gives the worst outcome of 
all as far as the debt burden is concerned. It is consequently a 
scenario that the government may wish to avoid. On the one hand, 
the debt ratio in Scenario E rises to only 42,97 per cent by 
1997, despite the fact that the interest rate remains high and 
rising. On the other, the budgetary situation underlying this 
scenario is comparatively much less favourable, for two reasons. 
Firstly, the combination of a primary deficit of 2 per cent of 
GNP (i.e., RIO,037 in 1987/88) with rising inflation and a high 
interest rate would lift the overall deficit, as a proportion of 
GNP, to almost 8 per cent by 1997, and the corresponding debt 
service ratio to almost 6 per cent of GNP. At this latter level, 
the debt service burden could approach 25 per cent of current 
government outlays by 1997. Secondly, these ratios would 
continue to rise rapidly after 1997 without the prospect of a 
turnabout, unless the primary deficit is curtailed by reducing 
non-interest expenditure or raising tax rates. However, reducing 
non-interest outlays, in particular, should be problematical when 
the budget already contains such a large component of expenditure 
over which the authorities have little or no control in the 
short- to medium-term. 
In other words, a scenario involving a sustained or rising 
inflation rate combined with, say, a 2 per cent primary deficit 
would be the most problematical for the budget. It would in 
addition continue to undermine investors' confidence in 
government securities, given the fact that such a scenario would 
rely more than any of the other scenarios on the continual 
erosion of the real value of the debt by inflation, in order to 
keep the debt ratio within bounds. Scenario E moreover implies 
an initial fall in the already negative real interest rate on the 
outstanding debt, and a return to the current situation by 1997, 
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compared to Scenarios A to D where the real interest on 
government debt will become positive again and rise/fall 
gradually to approximately 4 per cent by 1997, depending on the 
speed with which the inflation rate falls. By comparison 
Scenario E would thus help to sustain upward pressure on nominal 
and real interest rates by continuing to impose a net "inflation 
tax" on bondholders. 
It now remains to compare the aforementioned projections with a 
situation in which the government attempts to maintain a constant 
overall deficit, in relation to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
rather than a constant primary deficit ratio. 
8.5 A Constant Budget Deficit/GDP Ratio 
The purpose of this last series of scenarios is to project the 
longer-term debt and budgetary implications of a policy of 
maintaining the total budget deficit constant at 3 per cent of 
GDP, under different assumptions about inflation, real growth and 
interest rates. 
The projections will be made from an assumed deficit/GDP base of 
6,09 per cent in 1987/88. Because of the big gap between the 
latter ratio and the target of 3 per cent, it will be assumed 
that the process of consolidation takes place in two stages, 
i.e., that the deficit/GDP ratio is lowered to 4,5 per cent in 
1989/90 and then to its new trend level of 3 per cent in 1989/90. 
The projections under the three scenarios are based on the 
following further assumptions: 
Scenario PI 
The growth rate of real GDP, inflation r.itas and interest 
rates are as for Scenario A and C (i.e., GDP is assumed to grow 
at the same rate as GNP). 
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Scenario P2 
The growth rate of real GDP, inflation rates and interest 
rates are as for Scenario B and D. 
Scenario P3 
The growth rate of real GDP, inflation rates and interest 
rates are as for Scenario E. 
The results of the calculation are summarized in Table 23. 
Conclusions 
On average, realized total budget deficits equalled 3,83 per cent 
of GDP in the 1980s. Of this latter percentage, the debt service 
burden alone accounted for 3,72 per cent. The primary deficits 
as a ratio of GDP thus equalled only R100,0 million or 0,11 per 
cent of GDP. A careful inspection of the 1980s, however, reveal 
that deficits showed signs of rising during the last few years, 
and it is assumed for purposes of the projections in this section 
that the deficit as a ratio of GDP equalled 6,09 per cent in 
fiscal year 1987/88 (see Table 23). 
Against this background, Table 23 shows that a policy of 
reversing the recent rise in the overall deficit would initially 
involve a drastic squeeze on other components of the budget. 
Even if, as assumed, the period of consolidation is spread over 
two years, the process of turning round the budget would require 
a reduction of the primary deficit from its (assumed) current 
(1987/88) level of R3 068 million, to a broadly balanced 
situation in 1988/89, and then to a surplus of approximately 
R2 900 million in the following year, thus giving an effective 
cutback in (non-interest) outlays and/or additional revenues of 
close on R6 000 million over two years . If it is assumed that 
no more than a small part of this total will come from so-called 
automatic stabilizers, unless the economy (and the gold price) 
picks up significantly over the next two years, the major burden 
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of the adjustment will have to be in the form of discretionary-
cuts in expenditures (or tax increases). 
The further evolution of the situation after 1990 would depend a 
great deal on the pace of disinflation as well as the measure of 
success achieved in lowering the average interest rate on the 
growing volume of debt. However, all three scenarios considered 
here suggest a gradual lowering of the debt service burden as a 
ratio of GDP. In the gradual inflation scenario the point at 
which the debt burden as a ratio of GDP reaches 3 per cent (i.e., 
when the primary balance becomes positive again) will be reached 
in 1994/95, but this point will only be reached some time after 
1997 in the other two scenarios. It follows that a scenario of 
gradual deflation (as opposed to a rapid deflation or a further 
acceleration of inflation) will, by offering the twin benefits of 
a more gradual tightening of the screw on total deficits and a 
better synchronisation between the interest rate and the nominal 
(GDP) growth rate, have the effect of alleviating the burden of 
adjustment on the other components of the budget. 
Scenarios P2 (rapid deflation) and P3 (acceleration of inflation) 
give a broadly similar budgetary result between 1988 and 1997, 
except that budgetary aggregates, as opposed to the relevant 
ratios, are obviously vastly different. The two scenarios, 
however, differ more fundamentaly as far as the evolution of the 
debt/GDP ratio is concerned. Since it is the overall deficit 
ratio rather than the primary deficit ratio, which is now held 
constant, it is the growth rate of nominal GDP rather than the 
growth-interest differential which is the deciding factor as far 
as the evolution of the debt ratio is concerned. 
Table 23 reflects this by revealing that the inflationary 
scenario gives the lowest debt ratio of all by 1997 (i.e., 21,72 
per cent) while the rapid deflation scenario gives the highest 
ratio (i.e., 30,99 per cent). It stands to reason, moreover, 
that all three scenarios would indicate a decline in the debt 
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ratio from its present level, because of the tight rein kept on 
the total deficit. Indeed, using the 1996/97 situation as a 
base, the fiscal calculus would predict long-term equilibrium 
debt/GNP ratios of 18 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively, in 
the inflationary and deflationary scenarios. 
The interest rate (and therefore the growth-interest 
differential) is, however, an important determinant of the mix of 
the interest and non-interest components of the evolving total 
deficit between 1988 and 1997. As the interest rate decreases 
over time and the growth of the total debt proceeds at a 
relatively slower pace, the need for primary budget surpluses 
would diminish. 
However, a comparison of the projection under Scenario PI with 
the other two projections shows again that if the policy of 
disinflation is either very successful (Scenario P2) or 
unsuccessful (Scenario P3) the need for holding the primary 
balance on a tight rein would be prolonged. In other words, the 
degree of restraint imposed on the non-interest budget by a 
policy of keeping the debt/GDP ratio constant at, say, 3 per cent 
would depend on the rate of interest vis-a-vis the growth rate of 
nominal GDP. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
In the absence of traditional budget balancing norms, much 
depends on the government's own sense of responsibility to 
conduct budgetary policy in a disciplined and restrained manner. 
As we have mentioned, there is little support outside the United 
States for a return to the rigid budget balancing rules of former 
times, whether this comes in the form of an overall budget 
balancing rule, a constitutional prohibition on loan financing of 
current government outlays , or a legal limit on debt creation. 
On the contrary, in today's atmosphere of fiscal "permissiveness" 
it is widely recognised that norms such as these would be both 
politically unacceptable and economically undesirable. 
In particular, an injunction against loan-financing of current 
outlays would continue to suffer from a lack of credibility in 
South Africa unless the rule is applied in a medium-term context 
rather than on a strict annual basis, and even then definitional 
problems would present serious obstacles in view of the 
difficulty of distinguishing between productive and unproductive 
outlays at this stage of the country's development. A norm that 
new government debt should not be created unless it is for 
"productive" purposes might be quite unexceptional in principle, 
if used as a broad but supple guide for the conduct of the public 
finances, especially if there already exists a relatively large 
"unproductive" debt to contend with. However, as a self-imposed 
device to rationalise the enforcement of strict discipline over 
recalcitrant government departments, such a rule is bound at 
times to conflict visibly with both the shorter and longer-term 
interests of the country and its peoples, and is thus likely to 
be no more than a fair-weather measure. The danger of treating 
such a rule in what may appear to be an undisciplined or "on/of" 
manner, is that it is likely to undermine rather than enhance the 
credibility of policy. 
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The avoidance of serious fiscal imbalances and unstable debt 
conditions nonetheless remain a key responsibility of government. 
The task is particularly difficult in South Africa as the 
government is subject to very strong political, economic and 
social pressures to both increase spending and keep taxes down. 
The importance of high government spending as a potential source 
of fiscal imbalance is likely to continue or even to grow as 
existing services are extended to more people against a 
background of continued high spending on national defence. Over 
the last few years, the public finances in South Africa have 
often been characterised by critics as undisciplined in view of 
the apparent unrestrained growth especially of government current 
spending, and the resultant relatively high tax burden on the 
middle and the high-income groups of the population in 
particular. The Government's image as a spendthrift is 
unfortunately re-inforced by its apparent inability to maintain 
budgetary discipline, as a consequence of which considerable 
overspending on budget forecasts frequently occurs. 
There are several reasons why the South African Government could 
come under growing pressure to assign a more important role to 
its own longer-term debt situation in the annual budget 
presentation, and to concentrate more attention on the kind of 
issues addressed in this paper. These reasons include, firstly, 
the virtual inevitability of a long-term growth in demand for 
higher government 'current' as well as 'capital' expenditures to 
deal with the severe social and economic problems facing the 
country, especially if viewed against the background of the 
country's limited resources. There is a distinct possibility 
that serious difficulties might be experienced in accommodating 
such demands in a system which is subject to crude constraints on 
the financing of traditionally defined 'current' expenditure of 
the type referred to above. If these expected pressures on the 
budget materialise, the government may increasingly be forced to 
rationalise higher borrowing either by attempting to draw much 
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more relevant distinctions than hitherto between productive and 
non-productive current and capital expenditure, or by accepting a 
permanently higher level of debt as a ratio of GNP as inevitable. 
Secondly, the proceeds of the sale of public assets as part of 
the government's programme of privatisation could reach 
significant levels if the objective of 'rolling back the 
frontiers of the public sector' is pursued with vigour. In that 
case, guidelines need to be worked out timeously regarding the 
budgetary treatment of such proceeds. In particular, what is the 
proper relationship of the latter to movements in the public 
debt, and how will asset sales affect the level and stability of 
taxes over time? Should asset sales be applied to debt 
reduction, tax reduction, or the purchase of alternative assets? 
Do asset sales finance the budget deficit or reduce it? The 
haphazard budgetary treatment of the proceeds of the sale of 
public assets could play havoc with the government's finances 
because, as a source of revenue, they would be both irregular and 
temporary. In addition, the sale of government assets, currently 
or potentially yielding regular returns to the Exchequer, would 
cause a deterioration in the government's net debt position and 
raise net debt service costs if the proceeds are used to finance, 
for example, a reduction in tax rates rather than a reduction of 
the outstanding debt. On the other hand, tax reduction may 
currently enjoy the highest priority as a means to stimulate 
increases in the productive capacity of the economy. 
Since issues such as those mentioned above affect the long-term 
financial stability of the government, they are best examined in 
a longer-term context. This paper has accordingly attempted to 
put a medium-term analytical perspective on the inter-connection 
between current budgetary decisions and changes in the 
government's gross and net debt situations, both historically and 
prospectively-
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Historically, the clearest picture emerging from the discussion 
is the almost paradoxical fall in the gross debt/GNP ratio over 
the last two decades and its relative stability in the 1980s, on 
the one hand, and the rapid acceleration of gross as well as net 
debt service costs in the 1980s, on the other. Both these 
developments are at least partially related to the rapid 
acceleration of inflation over the last 15 years, for, while the 
high growth rates of nominal GNP (mainly inflationary) have 
continued to erode the real value of the outstanding debt in 
every year since 1972, inflation and inflationary expectations 
were probably belatedly instrumental in raising the average 
interest rate on government debt from about eight per cent in 
1980 to over 14,5 per cent in 1987. Simultaneously, the State's 
financial asset base was allowed to be seriously eroded over the 
last decade. The result has been a rapid acceleration of the 
government's net debt as well as its net debt service burden, 
with increases in the latter ranging from 16 per cent to 67 per 
cent per annum in the 1980s. The accommodation of such increases 
in the net debt service burden within the constraints imposed by 
traditional overall deficit levels, necessitated a drastic cut-
back of the primary (non-interest) deficit as a ratio of GNP in 
the 1980s. Under pressure to increase government spending and 
to lower taxes, such a situation may be neither sustainable nor 
desirable. 
Several of the scenarios considered in Section 8 are premised on 
the idea that the government would not be able to avoid large 
deficits. This study shows that the outlook over the next 
decade would not necesssarily be bleak if budget deficits were to 
rise. The current debt/GNP ratio is low by comparison with 
earlier years. There may consequently be scope tor expansion 
when, for example, the level of economic activity is low and 
stimulation of the economy is needed. In this connection it 
must, however, be remembered that the present relatively low debt 
ratio came about mainly as a result of its erosion by inflation. 
The unpleasant past experiences of investors in th»t regard may 
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very well have had the effect of Increasing the reluctance of 
investors to invest in government stock, so that increasing 
volumes of debt may not be absorbed by markets unless investors 
are compensated by significantly higher interest rates. This may 
have raised the fiscal constraint associated with any given level 
of debt to GNP. Unfortunately, the historical evolution of the 
debt/GNP ratio to its current (1987) level of 35,76 per cent 
gives few policy guidelines on what the debt/GNP ratio ought to 
be in South Africa, or what levels would be tolerable in the 
years that lie ahead. The experiences of other countries are 
also not helpful, since international comparisons are largely 
meaningless, because of wide institutional disparities, 
historical dissimilarities and countries' different stages of 
development. Domestic debt policy would thus remain a matter of 
discretion and experimentation. 
The results of several of the fiscal projections considered in 
this paper suggest that the government may have no choice but to 
accept a rise in the debt/GNP ratio over the next ten years, 
given the constraints on deficit reduction. Structurally higher 
debt ratios may in addition be an inescapable result of a 
disinflationary process. However, the medium-term projections 
also show that these scenarios will not necessarily lead to 
"explosive" debt situations. Moreover, part of further increases 
in debt service ratios may very well be temporary. On the other 
hand, the underlying conditions of stability may become much more 
delicately balanced than before, particularly when 
disinflationary policies are successful. This means that 
government will have to become much more watchful of the debt 
situation than in the past. 
Of the various cases considered, the worst forward-looking 
budgetary situation would result from a continuation of 
conditions of high inflation and interest rates, combined with 
relatively high budget deficits. Although such an inflationary 
scenario would indeed offer a slow rise in the debt/GNP ratio 
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between 1987 and 1997, it would give the highest debt service and 
deficit ratios by 1997 of the various scenarios considered, and 
would thus clearly be unsustainable except in the very short-
term. 
Pegging the total budget deficit to 3 per cent of GDP would 
involve drastic fiscal consolidation. However, either 
drastically cutting outlays or raising additional taxes, in 
order to turn round the current rising trend of total deficits, 
obviously offers the best hope of returning to a more comfortable 
budgetary situation, especially as far as the debt burden is 
concerned. It would further have the additional "advantage" of 
lowering the debt/GNP ratio to a much lower level. In this 
latter connection, and inflationary scenario would paradoxically 
be the most effective way of achieving such an outcome. Since 
there is, however, nothing sacrosanct about a 3 per cent 
deficit/GNP ratio per se, the actual ratio decided upon as a norm 
must be determined in the light of all short-term and longer-term 
issues. When faced by choices such as the foregoing, it is the 
uneviable task of the government to weigh up the longer-term 
advantages to be gained with relative certainty (i.e., a more 
comfortable debt service burden), and those that are less certain 
(i.e., a lower inflation rate and higher growth), against the 
obvious shorter-term disadvantages of a further drag on the 
economy, as well as the prospect that the policy may possibly 
backfire, both politically and economically. 
Given the prospect of a further rise in the debt/GNP ratio to a 
permanently higher level, as well as fluctuations of the ratio 
around the trend, it is almost axiomatic that movements in the 
country's debt situation must be assessed from a longer-term 
perspective in order to minimize any adverse expectational 
effects and to increase public acceptability of higher debt 
levels. Since annual fluctuations in debt and deficit levels may 
not be distinguishable from longer-term trends, a longer-term 
perspective on the annual budget is important in order to avoid 
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the creation of undersirable expectations and fears when budgets 
and debt ratios do in fact change. In the interest of the 
credibility of policy, the budget must therefore contain enough 
information for an evaluation of the effects that policy 
decisions made today will have on the public finances two, three 
or five years hence, and for an evaluation of its provisions in 
the context of any declared medium- or longer-term objectives. 
Unfortunately, the present framework and style of presentation of 
the South African budget are very poorly adapted to deal with the 
longer-term questions which have now resumed an important role in 
discussions of fiscal policy. References in recent budgets to 
some of these issues have been unsophisticated, superficial and 
undisciplined. The local situation compares unfavourably with 
the situation in some other countries where budgets frequently 
supply detailed analyses of, for example, issues relating to the 
public debt and future debt-servicing cost. The long-maintained 
one-year perspective of the budget, and its failure to provide 
any longer-term perspectives on current policies, must therefore 
be viewed as a serious obstacle in the way of a more effective 
use of the budget as a guide to responsible fiscal conduct. The 
style of presentation and the content of the South African budget 
clearly ought to be overhauled to enable it to throw light on a 
wider range of issues related to the government's handling of the 
State's finances than at present. 
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References 
(1) The t-erm "Central Government-" refers here to the 
government as a political entity. There is in fact- no 
single or consolidated budget for the combined central 
government, from a public financial point- of view. Data for 
the combined central government are however published ex 
post in the IMF's Government Financial Statistics (GFS). 
(2) The annual increase in the State Debt is not necessarily 
equal to the budget deficit. For a fuller discussion of 
this aspect, see Section 5.3. 
(3) Until the mid-1970s the term "public debt" was actually used 
officially to describe what is now designated as "State 
Debt". 
(4) See the IMF's Government- Finance Statistics. 
(5) Incorrectly referred to as "Staatskuld" by the South African 
Reserve Bank. See, eg., South African Reserve Bank, 
Quarterly Bulletin, June 1987, S-103. A much less confusing 
term in that particular context would be "openbare skuld". 
(6) See j van der s Heyns: Some New (and old) Approaches to 
Budgetary Policy: Implications for the South African Budget, 
Occasional Paper No.18, Economic Research unit, University 
of Natal, 1986. 
(7) For a viewpoint in favour of a constitutional fiscal 
limitation in the United Kingdom, see Burton (1978, 1985). 
(8) The Public Debt Commissioners (now the Public Investment 
Commissioners) continued with this tradition in their annual 
report on the activities of the General Sinking Fund, right 
up to the time of the recent abolition of the latter fund. 
(9) Specifications by different writers often differ because of 
diffences in basic assumptions. This paper does not attempt 
a reconciliation of Bispham's presentation with that of 
other writers such as Marriss (1985) and Chouraqui, Jones 
and Montador (1986). 
(10) The following assumptions apply: (a) interest payments in a 
given year depend on the outstanding debt at the beginning 
of the year; current budget deficits are therefore not 
permitted to affect current interest payments, and (b) r is 
the average interest rate on new debt, the entire debt being 
rolled over annually at this rate. 
(11) In practice, monies in the Stabilisation Account were used 
regularly to fund advances to the National Supplies 
Procurement Fund, and to alleviate temporary shortages in 
the Exchequer itself. 
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(12) Whilst interest is brought to account in t-he state Revenue 
Fund when payment falls due, discount on government stock is 
brought to account in the year in which t-he particular stock 
is issued. Debt service costs, as defined in this section, 
excludes the costs associated with realized foreign exchange 
losses/gains on foreign (including IMF) debt. Such losses, 
if any (i.e., there may also be net gains in a particular 
year), form a direct charge on the State Revenue Fund and 
are brought to account as part of total debt management 
charges when the loans are redeemed. Realised foreign 
exchange losses have been quite substantial in recent years. 
(13) This section is based on the analysis in Muller and Price, 
1984. 
(14) See Muller and Price, 1984, p.59. 
(15) This conclusion applies particularly to the conversion of 
outstanding loans to SATS. In the case of the Provincial 
Administrations, the government had always subsidised the 
Provincial Administrations' interest liabilities to the 
State under a separate vote. The conversion of the 
outstanding loans to the Administrations into permanent 
capital in 1977/78, and the concomitant abolition of t-he 
interest subsidy, were thus formalities involving no net 
cost (or saving) to t-he budget. 
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